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Executive summary
Introduction and aim of project
Livestock off-take (destocking) interventions have been conducted in Turkana, as an 
emergency relief measure, for the past two decades and have experienced differing 
degrees of success. In more recent times, VSF-Belgium has also been active in the fi eld 
of destocking. Initiated in September 2000 and culminating October 2005, the Turkana 
Livestock Development Programme Phase 1 (TDLP1) has been the fl ag ship of VSF-Belgium. 
The overall objective of TLDP1 was to improve the viability of the pastoralist way of life in 
Turkana. To achieve this, TLDP1 focused on four primary interventions, which formed the 
specifi c objectives of the program. These were to: a) improve animal health and production; 
b) increase access to dry season grazing areas; c) increase opportunities for the marketing of 
livestock and; d) to support peace building activities. In 2000–2001, VSF-Belgium initiated 
a combined intervention that provided both free fresh and dried goat meat to schools and 
health centres in Turkana and the subsidized transportation of goats and cattle to markets 
inside and outside the district. In 2005, VSF-Belgium was involved in two major livestock 
interventions of which destocking comprised an implicit or explicit component. A small 
number of goats were destocked as part of the Drought Response Programme, as payment in 
kind for part of the veterinary intervention package of the program. However, the principal 
destocking activity of VSF-Belgium, and the focus of this report, occurred in January and 
February 2005.
The 2005 ‘Turkana Emergency Livestock Off-take’ (TELO) intervention contributed to VSF-
Belgium’s overall goal to ‘improve the socio-economic status of the pastoral communities 
living in arid areas of Kenya by creating markets for their livestock and improving the 
nutritional status of identifi ed target populations’. The intervention had six outputs/objectives, 
namely to: increase household income (cash economy) among pastoralists; reduce pressure 
on water and pasture resources; increase food security for vulnerable school children; 
improve utilization of assets with livestock owners gaining benefi t from vulnerable livestock 
before the condition of the livestock deteriorates beyond the point of selling; increase 
access to funds made available to livestock owners for future restocking and; use money 
saved from the school feeding program for school fees and/or other relevant projects for 
the pastoralists’ school children. Viewed as a signifi cant success, and used as a model for 
subsequent destocking interventions, it is the aim of this report to evaluate the effi ciency and 
effectiveness of this destocking intervention to highlight both strengths and weaknesses of the 
approach used and to suggest improvements for future destocking interventions.
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Methodology
The research conducted as part of this analysis utilized a broad Actor Network Theory 
approach that set out to ‘follow the actors’ involved and analyse their specifi c contributions, 
both negative and positive, to the eventual outcome of the destocking intervention. In order 
to generate the insights required for a thorough analysis, both key informant interviews and 
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were undertaken. Key informant interviews were conducted 
with key individuals involved in the identifi cation of drought-related problems and their 
causes, and with those who deliberated potential solutions to the problems identifi ed and 
that eventually chose the course of action which they believed would achieve a range of 
humanitarian objectives. In addition, key informant interviews were also conducted with 
representatives from schools and health centres that benefi ted from receiving consignments 
of free goats. FGDs were held with key groups involved in the destocking intervention, 
namely, groups of pastoralists and livestock traders/LMA members in order to ascertain their 
actual role in the intervention compared to the role assigned to them by the architects of the 
destocking intervention. Key responses from key informants and FGDs were triangulated in 
order to validate the accuracy of the data generated.
In addition to a review of relevant literature, a signifi cant volume of secondary data was 
analysed comprising VSF-Belgium’s records of buyers, sellers and recipients of goats, prices 
paid, amounts purchased, delivery dates and the condition of goats delivered etc. This data 
was used to either corroborate or invalidate the fi ndings of the key informant interviews and 
FGDs.
Key results
1. There was substantial evidence of excellent, effi cient and effective multi-partner 
collaboration at the strategic planning and intervention design level. Discussions at 
this level appeared to be highly inclusive and collaborative, with the District Steering 
Group (DSG) and the Livestock Service Providers (LSP) forum acting as a proactive 
umbrella group for development actors in Turkana. Most of the principal development 
actors in the district were extremely supportive of the DSG’s role and were satisfi ed 
that the Group provided a forum for them to air their own ideas and concerns in an 
inclusive, almost corporatist environment. Unfortunately, however, analysis detected 
little community-level involvement in the planning and design stage of the intervention.
2. Whilst the team’s analysis suggests that the TELO intervention was a success, one of 
the most important results generated by the analysis was that in many cases the TELO 
fi eld data did not always corroborate data contained in the offi cial TELO Report. 
For example, whilst there is general agreement regarding the total number of goats 
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destocked (6264 goats in the TELO Report and 6, 338 goats in the TELO fi eld data), 
the TELO Report tended to overestimate the numbers of pastoralists (3212 in the TELO 
Report compared to 2, 565 in the TELO fi eld data—involving over 1000 adakars with 
an average of 2.5 households benefi ting per adakar) and livestock traders (523 in the 
TELO Report compared to 336 in the TELO fi eld data) benefi ting, and underestimate the 
number of institutions that benefi ted from receiving free goats (90 benefi ting institutions 
in the TELO Report compared to 105 the TELO fi eld data). In addition, it appears that 
the majority of goats were not slaughtered on same day as suggested by the TELO 
Report. Indeed, there is only slaughter records for 49% of the goats received.
3. Awareness raising activities (i.e. local barasas) did not reach all vulnerable pastoralists. 
4. Many pastoralists did not receive the set price of Kenya shilling (KES)1 800 for their 
goats; 435 pastoralists were underpaid for their goats (receiving as little as KES 350), 
whilst a minority (130) were overpaid.
5. Many goats were purchased on a fi rst-come, fi rst-served basis. This appeared to bias 
pastoralists with good local socio-political contacts and those closest to main arterial 
roads and market towns.
6. Traders purchased an average of 19 goats for the intervention. However, many traders 
complained that the intervention generated low profi t margins due to high bank charges 
for cashing their cheques (payments for the goats delivered to the recipient institutions), 
delays in receiving cash payments, feeding costs and goat mortalities (between goat 
purchase and delivery to recipient institutions). There was almost a consensus amongst 
sellers and buyers that, in future, pastoralists should receive KES 1000 per goat sold and 
traders should receive KES 500 margin for purchasing and delivering goats to recipient 
institutions. These values were suggested to refl ect the market value of goats, and 
pastoralists’ willingness to sell to external institutions, and the traders costs associated 
with buying and delivering goats (including feeding costs and goat mortalities).
7. While the intervention did not affect market prices, it did improve market attendance 
during, and for a few months after, the destocking intervention. Whilst traders suggested 
that the destocking intervention was only a small part of their total business, they 
complained that it tied up much of their working capital for up to 4 weeks.
8. There was a general consensus amongst institutions receiving free goats (schools and 
health centres) that too many, often unhealthy, goats were delivered over a short period 
of time. Most institutions suggested that they could not either consume, or store, the 
amount of goats scheduled to be delivered. In many cases goats were held at the 
schools and health centres until they were ready to eat them or traders were asked to 
1. In March 2008, USD 1 = Kenya shilling (KES) 68.90. 
xdelay deliveries until the recipient institutions were ready to slaughter and consume 
them. It is likely that the miss-match between supply and demand resulted in the 
processing of slaughter records for only 49% of goats supplied through the intervention.
9. Recipient institutions suggested that unforeseen costs were accrued in feeding and 
caring for the goats, delivered by local traders, until they were slaughtered and 
consumed.
10. Schools and health centres used the free goat meat to substitute the provision of animal 
protein in their pupils’ and in-patients’ diets rather than to supplement. However, due to 
the high volumes of goat meat supplied to recipient institutions, the free goat supplied 
both substituted and increased the usual animal protein content of pupils’ and in-
patients’ diets. 
11. Savings that accrued from not having to purchase the usual quantities of goats 
consumed and from the sale of goat skins (which should have been collected by the 
Local Off-take Community Committees (LOCCs) were used to buy essential items for 
the institutions). However, these expenditures were not accounted for.
General recommendations
There should be greater community-level involvement in the design of pastoralist • 
interventions.
Future interventions in livestock systems should bolster existing drought mitigation • 
strategies.
VSF-Belgium should continue to promote the market economy in Turkana via • 
bolstering local livestock markets and market institutions.
Future interventions should seek to enhance and expand general livelihood strategies.• 
Emergency interventions should incorporate a key research component as it can • 
contribute to the process of improving the effectiveness and effi ciency of future 
livestock system interventions.
Specifi c recommendations
There should be greater involvement of local communities in the future design and • 
implementation of destocking interventions.
The creation of new apolitical community-based institutions should be considered. It • 
is recommended that LOCCS could be transformed into permanent or semi-permanent 
local crisis committees.
Crisis committees should also play an active, transparent, and participatory role in • 
devising the logistics of free goat meat distribution in a transparent, verifi able and 
participatory manner.
In conjunction with executive implementing agencies, local crisis committees should • 
play a proactive role in the identifi cation of free goat meat benefi ciaries.
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Future destocking interventions should consider using local crisis committees to • 
monitor pastoralists in their local areas and to identify the most vulnerable pastoralists 
in the most vulnerable pastoralist households.
Ideally, future destocking interventions should consider prioritizing the provision • 
of free goat meat, and/or other key necessities, to the most vulnerable households 
(identifi ed by local crisis committees). Where this is not possible, the provision of free 
goat meat to schools and health centres is also recommended.
In order to achieve a greater nutritional impact, day schools should be targeted before • 
boarding schools, as children in day schools do not usually consume meat in their 
daily diets. Only after all day schools have been reached should boarding schools be 
considered.
Systems should be developed, and strictly applied, that better match free goat supply • 
to consumption demand and ensure that free goat meat supplements, and not merely 
substitutes, usual animal protein consumption (particularly if the supply of goat meat 
mirrors the institute’s usual goat meat consumption). A system should also be devised 
for verifying school childrens’ additional consumption of goat meat.
Future destocking interventions should account for the need to hold goats until they • 
are ready for delivery and slaughter. This includes internalizing the costs associated 
with feeding and caring for the goats. It is also suggested that goat skins could be sold 
by recipient institutions.
It is imperative that, in future destocking interventions, verifi cation protocols are both • 
comprehensive and rigorously adhered to. It is important that recipient institutions 
should provide detailed and verifi able accounts of what savings from suspended 
goat meat purchases, and goat skins were used for. It is also imperative that clear and 
accurate records are kept for the number, condition, timing, and slaughter of goats 
received, as well as for verifi able details of their consumption.
Future destocking interventions should consider adopting a two-tier system. In this system, 
relatively less vulnerable households, with larger livestock holdings, would be encouraged 
to actively destock and receive salvage payments for their goats. Conversely, the most 
vulnerable households would become net recipients of free goat meat and/or key necessities.
11 Introduction
Designated as one of Kenya’s ASALs (Arid and Semi-Arid Lands), Turkana District is located 
in northwestern part of Kenya bordering Ethiopia to the North, Sudan to the northwest and 
Uganda to the west. Turkana District covers an area of approximately 77 thousand km2 (Ajele 
2005) and has an estimated population of 497,779 (ITDG 2005). Turkana is the largest, yet 
least developed, district in the country. Rainfall in the district is bimodal (long and short 
rains). However, it is becoming increasingly erratic, with average precipitation ranging from 
121 mm in the east to over 540 mm in the northwest. While droughts are a regular feature 
in Kenya’s ASALs, it is widely believed that droughts are occurring more frequently and are 
becoming more severe. For example, the 1999–2001 drought in Turkana was more severe 
than the previous droughts of 1992–93 and 1996–97 (Aklilu and Wekesa 2002). Traditionally, 
during both short and long rains, pastoralists spread themselves across the plains. When 
drought begins, pastoralists migrate to the high mountain areas and even to neighbouring 
countries of Uganda and Sudan and into the Pokot Mountains in search of pasture and water 
for their livestock. As a direct result of the low and erratic precipitation, high temperatures, 
localized occurrences of highly saline soils and soils of low mineral content, there is 
relatively little vegetation cover and the district is predisposed to soil erosion. Less than 
3% of the district has agricultural potential, which is generally restricted to the hinterlands 
of permanent rivers (Ajele 2005). However, most of the land is suitable for grazing and 
browsing. Nomadic pastoralism, based on the subsistence-based exploitation of shifting 
grazing and browsing opportunities, is central to the Turkana District’s economy. At least 
64% of the population are dependent on pastoralism for their livelihoods, with a further 16% 
dependent on agro-pastoralism. Livestock forms an integral part of the communities’ social 
and spiritual life. In addition to providing life sustaining products (such as milk, blood, meat, 
hides, skins and ghee), goats, sheep, cattle and camels are used as payment of bride price 
and in local rituals. The remaining population in Turkana District relies on fi shing around 
Lake Turkana (12%), which is also a drought mitigation strategy for nomadic pastoralists 
during severe droughts, and 8% who rely on income from numerous small businesses in 
Turkana’s urban areas. There are also small-scale gold panning enterprises at Lochoremoit, 
Namoruputh and Ng’akoriyiek along the Lodwar–Kakuma highway. 
During the past 20 years or more, the survival of nomadic pastoralism as a traditional 
subsistence-based livelihood strategy has been increasingly threatened by increased 
human population, livestock diseases, persistent droughts and low rainfall, reduced access 
to traditional rangelands, and general insecurity. In a recent study undertaken by the 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), 100% of pastoralists surveyed in Turkana 
indicated that drought was a key livelihoods challenge. In addition, 97.5% cited raids and 
insecurity and 65% cited the lack of permanent water nearby as key livelihoods challenges 
2(ILRI 2006). During times of drought, 82.5% of respondents indicated that a lack of water and 
food, lack of pasture (62.5%), livestock fatalities (60%), and human and livestock diseases 
(45%) were the principal problems faced during times of drought. Persistent droughts 
and low erratic rainfall have undermined the pastoralists’ traditional drought mitigation 
strategies of migrating in search of water and pasture, and the preservations of grazing areas 
for times of extreme drought. Other drought mitigation strategies include division of large 
herds into smaller units (species and production specifi c); keeping of multiple species; 
stock loaning between relatives and friends; additions to the diet, such as wild fruits and 
bartered cereals and; begging for food (VSF-Belgium 2006). According to ILRI (2006), 52.5% 
of the respondents surveyed in Turkana traditionally migrated to water and pasture, 25% 
slaughtered livestock and preserved meat, 17.5% collected wild fruits and gums, and 15% 
initiated small businesses as a means of drought mitigation. In response to the drought of 
October 2005, 27.5% suggested that they were initiating alternative businesses, whereas 
15% were doing nothing. Access to grazing land is also becoming increasingly diffi cult 
as local authorities have expropriated land from the pastoralists, which should have been 
held in trust. Furthermore, private property rights, associated with private land tenure, and 
urbanization excludes pastoralists from many vital grazing and water resources. All this is 
exacerbated by pasture degradation through over-grazing and the encroachment of an exotic 
plant known as Prosophis. 
In attempts to ameliorate the devastating impacts of these recurrent threats, various 
international and regional organizations sought to support the livelihoods of pastoralists 
in Turkana by reinforcing local management capacities; assisting control of livestock pests 
and diseases, destocking and restocking interventions and; improving the sustainability 
and use of natural resource management. In addition, in recent years, organizations have 
attempted to introduce pastoralists to the cash economy and promote market integration 
through the development of livestock sell yards, slaughter houses, market days and marketing 
associations. Interestingly, in the ILRI research discussed earlier, 80% of respondents cited a 
lack of livestock markets and poor livestock prices as key livelihoods challenges (ILRI 2006). 
Furthermore, 60% indicated that, in response to drought, they traditionally sold livestock in 
order to purchase food. In response to the drought of October 2005, 62.5% of the pastoralists 
surveyed indicated that they were selling livestock in order to purchase food and water. 
When asked about their preferred livelihoods interventions, 67.5% of respondents prioritized 
food relief and fi nancial support for small-scale business, 60% preferred assistance in 
enhancing community water storage, and 57.5% requested assistance in restocking. When 
asked about their preferred livestock intervention, 100% indicated animal health care, and 
50% indicated the provision of water.
31.1 Destocking initiatives in Turkana
Destocking initiatives in Turkana have met with mixed success. One of the earliest destocking 
interventions was undertaken by the World Food Programme (WFP) in 1990. Designed as 
an emergency intervention, the aim of the Emergency Livestock Purchase intervention was 
to: improve ecological balance through destocking; increase pastoralists’ purchasing power 
through direct income transfer and; improve food security amongst some of the most food 
insecure pastoralists in the district. Agents working on behalf of the Government of Kenya 
(GoK) bought 2768 shoats at auction sites and then sold them on to traders; the money 
formed part of a revolving fund. Unfortunately, many shoats were emasculated and unhealthy 
and died before they arrived at the project’s holding ground. Reviews of the intervention 
suggested that, while it could be seen as a success in many ways, the intervention was based 
on many unrealistic assumptions. Firstly, they assumed that GoK buyers would be able to 
detect and select the most vulnerable pastoralists at the livestock auction sites. Second, 
architects of the intervention assumed that the price offered for shoats would only attract the 
poorest and most desperate pastoralists; in reality, the price offered was attractive to both 
small-scale and large-scale livestock owners. The fact that buying took place on a fi rst-come, 
fi rst-served basis exacerbated the situation. Third, it was assumed that the shoats offered for 
sale would be weak but healthy. In reality, a number of emaciated and unhealthy shoats 
were offered for sale, but many died before they could be sold to local traders. Lastly, the 
scale of intervention was far too small to affect stocking densities—something the review 
team believed could only be achieved through regular market interventions. However, the 
review team did uncover evidence to support the claim that the intervention would increase 
the purchasing power of pastoralists and, by default, enhance food security. The review 
team concluded that while the intervention was not a model destocking exercise, it was a 
legitimate tool to provide emergency support directly to pastoralists (Bush 1997; Wekesa 
1997).
In more recent times, VSF-Belgium has been active in the fi eld of destocking. Initiated 
in September 2000 and culminating October 2005, the Turkana Livestock Development 
Programme Phase 1 (TDLP1) has been the fl ag ship of VSF-Belgium. The overall objective 
of TLDPI was to improve the viability of the pastoralist way of life in Turkana. To achieve 
this overall objective the program focused on four primary interventions, which formed the 
specifi c objectives of the program. These were to: improve animal health and production; 
increase access to dry season grazing areas; increase opportunities for the marketing of 
livestock and; to support peace building activities. The target population of TLDP1 were the 
pastoralist communities in four divisions of the Central Region of Turkana District, namely, 
Turkwell, Kakuma, Kerio and Loima. The program was implemented by a core team of VSF 
Belgium in close collaboration with other development actors, namely, CBOs, local NGOs, 
4government departments, regional bodies and international NGOs. In 2000, as part of 
TDLP1, VSF-Belgium launched an emergency livestock off-take intervention based on the 
promotion of livestock marketing. This intervention comprised a small component of a suite 
of interventions in the north of Kenya, part of the ‘Livestock Intervention Programme’, the 
most signifi cant emergency intervention in Kenya’s history.
Funded by the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF), to the value of USD 120 
thousand (or KES 9 million), VSF-Belgium, together with the Netherlands Development 
Organisation (SNV), planned to purchase 18 thousand kg of dried goat meat and 1702 kg 
of fresh goat meat. The proposal was initially discussed by members of Turkana’s District 
Steering Group (DSG) and in its technical advisory committee, the Livestock Service 
Providers forum (LSP). Together with SNV, VSF-Belgium proceeded to organize community 
dialogue workshops (CDWs) to sensitize communities to the forthcoming intervention and 
to solicit their participation. CDWs were conducted in all areas targeted for the intervention: 
Kaleng, Kaikorr, Lodwar, Lorugum, Kalokol, Lokori and Lokichar.
The destocking proposal had four main objectives: 
to salvage some of the capital in the animals at risk by providing the opportunity for • 
livestock owners to sell stock before it died; 
to support relief efforts by distributing dried meat to vulnerable groups, such as school • 
children, and feeding centres;
to increase the cash available to pastoralists and• 
to relieve pressure on scarce water and pasture resources.• 
The project began in November 2000, and continued until January 2001. The intervention 
was designed so that pastoralists’ used their own money to purchase small stock. After 
slaughter, and inspection by Public Health Technicians, the meat was dried, weighed and 
purchased by the executing agency. Implemented in Central and Southern Turkana, the 
executing agencies paid KES 7.4 million, averaging KES 569 per animal, for 5951 kg of dried 
meat, far short of the 18 thousand kg stipulated in the proposal, and 1702 kg of fresh from 
13 thousand small stock. The total cost of preparing and drying the meat from one animal 
amounted to KES 950. Meat was then sold to the project at KES 1200, leaving a profi t of KES 
250 per animal; with offal sold separately for an additional KES 150, leaving a total profi t of 
KES 400 (Aklilu and Wekesa 2002). During this part of the off-take intervention, VSF-Belgium 
supplied 6398 kgs of dried meat and 2376 kgs of fresh meat to 41 schools and health centres, 
directly benefi ting approximately 9000 malnourished children and 304 tuberculosis in-
patients. According to Aklilu and Wekesa (2002), the destocking intervention injected a total 
of KES 7.14 million into the local Turkana economy.
5The intervention was praised for targeting the areas most devastated by the drought. 
However, whilst there was evidence of adequate community consultation, participation 
and involvement during the implementation phase of the intervention, greater community 
involvement would have been benefi cial in the planning phase of the intervention, 
particularly in determination of the type of meat destined to be processed. Suggestions 
for improvement for future destocking activities include the need for simpler and speedier 
reimbursement procedures. Unless circumstances dictate otherwise, pastoralist communities 
also prefer fresh meat to dried meat. 
As part of the same intervention, VSF-Belgium, using USD 51,021 from CDTF, aimed to 
increase off-take rates of goats, sheep and cattle and encourage market integration by 
providing subsidized transportation. The intervention aimed to facilitate the movement of 
12 thousand small stock and 900 cattle out of the district. The intervention was bimodal: 
providing a 40% subsidy for the purchase and sale of livestock both inside and outside 
Turkana District. However, despite the fact that the implementing agency introduced rigorous 
accounting procedures and administration protocols, their reliance on many local actors, 
with their own internal agendas, allowed for fraudulent behaviour that quickly exhausted 
the project’s budget, as well as cutting into funds originally allocated for the dried meat part 
of the intervention. In total, the intervention was able to facilitate the transportation of 1175 
cattle and 3584 sheep and goats out of the district, plus a further 20,688 sheep and goats 
moved internally. According to Aklilu and Wekesa (2002), the intervention’s impact on water 
and pasture resources was negligible.
In 2005, as part of the Drought Response Programme (DRP), a massive veterinary 
intervention across nine districts in Northern and Northeastern Kenya, four teams of 
veterinarians, under VSF-Belgium leadership, conducted mass treatments of many shoats 
and cattle in Turkana District. Whilst livestock vaccinations were offered at no charge to the 
pastoralists, treatments (wormers etc) were undertaken on a full-cost basis. As a result, VSF-
Belgium received 2199 goats as in-kind payments for livestock treatments. Ultimately, goats 
were given away to a total of 61,852 benefi ciaries, namely, vulnerable school children and 
families in the areas of operation.
In January and February of 2005, VSF-Belgium undertook its penultimate destocking 
intervention. The overall goal of the intervention was to ‘improve the socio-economic 
status of the pastoral communities living in arid areas of Kenya by creating markets for 
their livestock and improving the nutritional status of identifi ed target populations. The 
intervention had six objectives/outputs: to increase household income (cash economy) 
among pastoralists; to reduce pressure on water and pasture resources; to increase food 
security for vulnerable school children; to improve utilization of assets with livestock owners 
6gaining benefi t from vulnerable livestock before the condition of the livestock deteriorates 
beyond the point of selling; to increase access to funds made available to livestock owners 
for future restocking and;  to use the money saved from school feeding program for school 
fees and/or other relevant projects for the pastoralists’ school children. Viewed as a signifi cant 
success, and used as a model for proceeding destocking interventions, it is the aim of this 
report to evaluate the effi ciency and effectiveness of this destocking intervention, to highlight 
both strengths and weaknesses of the approach used and to suggest improvements for future 
destocking interventions.
72 Methodology
2.1 Conceptual framework
Actor Network Theory (ANT), supported by neo-classical economics, forms the conceptual 
framework for the evaluation. ANT has been utilized throughout the past 20 years to analyse 
the interactions between society and technology (Callon 1991; Latour 1991). Unlike theories 
of social determinism, where technology is viewed as being defi ned by the social and 
technological determinism, and where technology develops according to its own internal 
necessity and is beyond human control, ANT attempts to demonstrate that technological and 
institutional changes are not guided solely by either society or technology. ANT demonstrates 
how the interactions between humans and non-humans, humans and humans, and non-
humans and other non-humans are a result of both parties. As viewed by ANT, there is always 
a goal for the interactions between different actors. That goal involves the transference of 
some intermediary from actor A to actor B. Both actors are inscribed with certain properties 
which will assist in the transference. But these inscriptions also prescribe the ways in which 
the actors are allowed to interact. If there is a failure to follow these prescriptions, no 
transference will occur. ANT is concerned with the processes by which ideas are accepted 
and tools and methods are adopted. ANT describes a progressive constitution of a network 
in which both human and non-human actors assume identities according to the prevailing 
strategies of interaction. Actors’ identities and qualities are defi ned during negotiations 
between representatives of human and non-human actants.
ANT follows four basic steps, each with its specifi c tools (Gray et al. 1997). The fi rst step 
involves the identifi cation of problems and driving forces. The second step involves the 
identifi cation of each agent’s interests. The third step is enrolment, which involves collective 
deliberation of the most appropriate form of action to take. The fourth step is mobilization, 
which consists of trying new technological and institutional practices.
According to ANT, the role of the principal actors involved in the 2005 destocking 
intervention was to: 
identify key problems and driving forces; • 
identify the interests of key actors and; • 
catalyse the enrolment of key actors and actants and mobilize actors in a coordinated • 
network of activities. 
This primarily consisted of the enrolment of both human and non-human actors in order 
to achieve their goal(s). Developed by VSF-Belgium, in close collaboration with other key 
development actors, the destocking proposal formed the principal tool for guiding core 
destocking activities and, in conjunction with their staff on the ground, for facilitating action 
8at a distance. The proposal (text) can be understood as a means of aligning heterogeneous 
elements (development actors, pastoralists, livestock traders, Livestock Marketing 
Associations (LMAs), school head masters, health centre managers, other texts, equipment, 
procedures, and more) to achieve the goals set out in the proposal. However, according 
to ANT, each of these aligned elements has a reality outside the text. In the case of VSF-
Belgium’s destocking intervention, it translates to mean that, just because the destocking 
proposal and implementation protocols, developed by VSF-Belgium, delineated the role of 
each actor, there is no guarantee that all, if any, actor(s) will execute their roles according 
to the logic laid down. In effect, two possible scenarios exist. The fi rst is that, if properly 
enrolled, all actors and actants will play the role assigned to them. The second is that, if 
improperly enrolled, all, or some actors and actants will deviate from their roles to a greater 
or lesser extent. Depending on the centrality of the actors and actants with regard to the 
success of the intervention, and on the extent of deviations, the unfurling of interactions 
between actors and actants will either substantiate the assumptions contained within the text 
or undermine them.
2.2 Empirical methodology
Methodologically, ANT has two major approaches. One is to ‘follow the actor’ via interviews 
and ethnographic research. In this respect, ANT was utilized to shed light on the socio-
technical and institutional networks that VSF-Belgium created in order to achieve their goals. 
The other major approach is to examine inscriptions such as the destocking proposal and 
implementation protocols (texts), which make action at a distance possible. Both approaches 
were utilized during the evaluation. 
With regard to following the actors, several participatory tools were developed and 
implemented in order to ascertain the roles of key actors within the destocking process. Key 
informant interviews were conducted with key individuals involved in the identifi cation 
of key problems, and their causes, and with those who deliberated potential solutions to 
the problems identifi ed and that eventually chose the course of action which they believed 
would achieve their objectives and contribute to their overall goal (see Appendices 1and 2). 
In addition, key informant interviews were also conducted with representatives from schools 
and health centres that benefi ted from receiving consignments of free goats (see Appendix 
3). Furthermore, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were held with key groups involved in 
the destocking intervention, namely, groups of pastoralists (see Appendix 4) and livestock 
traders/LMA members (see Appendix 5) in order to ascertain their actual role, compared to 
the role assigned to them by the architects of the destocking intervention. Key responses from 
key informants and FGDs were triangulated in order to validate the accuracy of the data 
generated.
9With respect to the examining of inscriptions, a review of relevant literature was undertaken 
to ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of previous destocking activities in Turkana in 
order to contextualize the destocking intervention under evaluation. In addition, a signifi cant 
volume of secondary data was analysed in the form of VSF-Belgium’s records of buyers, 
sellers and recipients of goats, prices paid, amounts purchased, delivery dates and the 
condition of goats delivered etc. This data was used to either corroborate or invalidate the 
fi ndings of the key informant interviews and FGDs. VSF-Belgium’s destocking proposal and 
implementation protocols were used as the key texts to evaluate whether or not the proposal 
contained valid assumptions and that these texts, in conjunction with VSF-Belgium staff were 
able to ensure that the destocking intervention unfurled as planned. The economic rationality 
of principal actors was also evaluated at each key juncture as a complementary measure of 
both the effi ciency of the destocking design and the decisions made by key actors.
In order to assess the quantitative aspects of the destocking intervention, all relevant data 
from the ‘Turkana Emergency Livestock Off-take Monitoring forms’ and from (nameless) goat 
purchasing forms were processed into a database. This was done in a meticulous manner by 
two data enterers at ILRI and the data was checked and cleaned by a scientist/author. A total 
of 379 deliveries to schools and 2638 transactions between traders and goat owners were 
documented. The resulting total numbers of goats, institutions and benefi ciaries may differ 
slightly from the TELO Final Report. However, this exercise was not intended as an audit, 
and it is also possible that some mistakes may have occurred in the interpretation of fi eld 
records. Ultimately, information extracted from the data in this exercises should be regarded 
as complementary to the information already available in the TELO Final Report.
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3 Findings/results
3.1 Participation in the 2004–05 destocking intervention
3.1.1 Number and timing of goat deliveries and slaughter
Most goats were purchased by traders from owners at the adakar level. These purchases were 
documented with forms (hereafter referred to as ‘goat purchasing forms’) provided to the 
traders by the implementing agency. The forms captured: trader’s name, goat owners’ names, 
their ID, sex, number of goats purchased; price received/paid, their adakar (village) name and 
fi nally their signature (or fi nger print).
Goat handling by traders
After purchase, traders delivered their goats to predetermined schools or health centres. From 
the onset of the intervention, it was decided to also deliver goats to some schools in areas 
that were not targeted by the destocking (e.g. Kakuma, Lobei and Kalokol). For the benefi ting 
schools in those areas, goats were sourced from other targeted areas. In the FGDs with 
traders, many individuals complained that goats were often in their care for many days before 
being delivered to the schools. This was also the case in areas were the goats were bought 
locally, as some schools preferred to receive the goats in small batches. Unfortunately, we 
were not able to quantify the number of days that goats were in the care of traders, as the 
format provided to the traders to document their sourcing of goats from adakar goat owners 
did not require the dates of purchase. Moreover the name of the goat owners and their 
adakar was recorded but not the current locations of these respective adakars, making it 
diffi cult to trace the goat movements between areas.
Goat deliveries to the schools
A full list of goat deliveries to the schools is provided in Appendix 6, which includes the 
reported dates of deliveries. The data suggests that goat deliveries to the institutions in 
central and south Turkana were synchronized events as the vast majority of deliveries were 
recorded on the 31st January and the 14th February. In Lake Zone and Northwest Turkana, 
the deliveries seemed much more dispersed. After detailed examination, the evaluation team 
concluded that the delivery dates were not always accurate but, nonetheless, were able to 
summarize the total number of goats delivered per zone, the number of institutions that 
benefi ted and the average number of goats delivered to each institution (see Table 1).
The total number of goats destocked during the TELO intervention was less than 1% of the 
total population of goats in Turkana District. In addition to 1,956,200 goats, Turkana District 
also has 975,600 sheep, 193,600 cattle, 140,800 camels and 32,600 donkeys (MLFD 2003).
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Table 1. Summary of goat deliveries documented in TELO fi eld data
Zone Total goats delivered
Number of 
institutions
Average number of 
goats/institution
Central 1637 20 82
Lake Zone 1188 18 66
Northwest 1082 26 42
South 2431 41 59
6338 105
Making sense of goat ‘delivery’ dates
The off-take monitoring forms (used at the institutions level) seemed well designed with 
signatures and dates fi lled by various stakeholders along the process: the trader, an LMA 
offi cial, two or more LOCC members, the head of receiving institution, the TELO fi eld 
monitor, and fi nally the VSF-B supervisor. Unfortunately, as with the goat purchasing forms, 
more often than not, the date of purchase was not recorded. In cases were an LMA offi cial 
was available, and was supposed to record the date of purchase, more often than not, it 
seems that he copied the delivery date that was used by the LOCC offi cials and the head 
of institutions. It seems that in most cases, the ‘delivery date’, entered by the LOCCs, was 
in fact the date that the school master closed his records on the goat slaughtering. In other 
cases it corresponded with the fi rst day of slaughter, presumably the same day the goats 
were delivered. Some slaughter dates even predate the date of deliveries and sometimes 
even the date of purchase. This could usually be understood by the fact that most schools 
received several deliveries of goats, so the slaughter dates could relate to goats from previous 
deliveries.
Goat slaughter documentation
Under the section to be completed by the head of an institution (usually a school head 
master or head nurse) there was a space in which the slaughter dates were supposed to be 
recorded, including the meat inspection details. Unfortunately, these records were not kept 
beyond the 3-week period of goat deliveries. While most schools wanted to keep some 
goats to slaughter in the following weeks, head masters and LOCCs must have been under 
pressure from the traders, and perhaps the monitors were under pressure from the project 
management, to quickly process paperwork in order for the traders to get refunded as soon 
as possible. As a result, slaughtering of goats at the schools after the initial 3-week period has 
not been properly documented, or was not incorporated in the otherwise well-kept TELO 
fi eld records.
A summary of the goats delivered compared to the goat slaughter records is presented in 
Appendix 7. In 11 institutes, the records even suggest that more goats were slaughtered 
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than received. After neglecting the ‘over-slaughtered’ number of goats (712 out of 3847), 
according to the TELO fi eld data, the remaining 3135 slaughtered goats comprise only 
49% of the total goats delivered. From 18 institutes no records of slaughtering were kept 
at all. These were mostly in south and northwest Turkana and are listed in the 2nd table in 
Appendix 7.
The records clearly show a pattern whereby goats were mostly slaughtered on Mondays, 
Wednesdays and Fridays—which concurs with the days that the boarding schools usually 
have meat on the menu for their evening meals. Slaughter records were only kept during the 
3 weeks of the intervention, starting on Monday 31st January 2005 with slaughters in Central 
and south Turkana, while Lake Zone and Northwest Turkana followed on Wednesday 2nd 
February. In Central Turkana most slaughter records ended as early as 14th February, while for 
the other zones the records continue until Monday 21st or Friday 25th February.
Through key informant interviews with school head masters, the evaluation team learned 
that many schools had incurred cost of hiring herdsmen to keep the goats until they were 
slaughtered. It was assumed that goats were kept at schools for a period of several weeks, but 
this could not be substantiated due to the incompleteness of the slaughter records described 
above. When regarding only those goats that were not slaughtered on the same day as 
delivery (601 out of 787 records), it was determined that they were only kept for an average 
of 5 days (5.08 n=601 St.Dv 3.56) and this hardly varied between zones. However, the 
caveats of the slaughter data should be taken into account. The evaluation team noted that, 
the recorded slaughter dates could not always be trusted. Some schools in Central (Kerio, 
Namorupouth, Naremit and Turkana Girls Primary) and in south Turkana (Kapese, Lochwa, 
Lokichar) had records of slaughtering 35 or even 65 goats on the same day as the delivery. 
This is hardly credible considering the size of those schools and the fact that they could never 
preserve such quantities without a cold room. Moreover, the maximum number of days that 
goats were kept—respectively 18 and 24 days—is also the exact duration of the slaughter 
records. This may point to the fact that some slaughter dates may have been ‘invented’ in 
order to close the books. And it is likely that those goats (51%) that were not accounted for in 
the slaughter records have been kept for several weeks after the intervention period.
3.1.2 Types and number of benefi ciaries of destocking
Adakars and households reached
Based on TELO fi eld data, the emergency livestock off-take managed to have a reasonable 
spread throughout the areas targeted. It is noteworthy that (probably) over 1000 adakars 
and about 2.5 households per adakar were reached (see Table 2). However, it should be 
noted that although the data set was well cleaned for names of schools and traders, there 
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was no time to compare all names of the adakars and goat owners. It is therefore very likely 
that some names of adakars have been double-counted (in our pivot tables) as they were 
spelt differently by different individuals. An enumeration of the adakars reached per zone is 
presented in Appendix 8. In some cases no adakar name was listed on the purchasing forms. 
In such cases, these could be those previously mentioned or new adakars. Table 2 shows a 
range of adakars per zone to acknowledge this factor. 
Table 2. Spread of the intervention: Number of adakars and goat owners reached
Zone No. of benefi t-ing adakars
No. of goats 
sold
No. of owners/
sellers
Average goat sold 
per owner
Central 543–547 1626 1044 1.56
Lake Zone 137–144 1140 355 3.22
Northwest 92–96 1058 310 3.44
South 231–240 2513 856 2.95
Overall total 1003–1027 6337 2565 2.48
Notwithstanding the fact that the names of goat owners have not been ‘cleaned’, which 
would have led to less names of owners in the database, the data ‘as is’ proved that goat 
owners at the adakar level were able to sell not less than 1.5 goats each, and in the areas 
further away from Lodwar (and project management) the average was even 3 goats or more, 
(see Table 2). Although the guidelines of the intervention stipulated that traders should only 
buy 1 goat from each individual household, the resulting averages still suggest a reasonable 
spread.
The livestock off-take intervention used the ‘services’ of 336 traders. A summary of the traders 
by zones of Turkana and the number of their transactions is presented in Table 3. In the 
Central Zone, the task seemed to have been divided among more traders than in the other 
zones. This may be due to the strength of the LMAs in this zone that VSF-B helped develop 
and with whom they continue to have a good relationship. In the other zones, those further 
away from Lodwar, there seems to have been more room for chairmen, or other strong 
individual traders, to monopolize a large chunk of the purchases for the intervention. While 
the average number of goats purchased per trader in Central Turkana was only 10 goats, in 
the other zones over 70% of the traders bought more than 10 goats, with Northwest Turkana 
traders buying as many as 42 and Southern Turkana traders buying 30 goats on average. 
Prior to the emergency livestock off-take project in Turkana, the purchase price for one 
drought affected, mature, healthy goat was established at KES 1000. This price was discussed 
and agreed by the Livestock Service Providers and approved by the District Steering Group 
(DSG) and was uniform throughout the district. Out of KES 1000, KES 800 was to be paid 
to the livestock owners/producers and the balance of KES 200 was the margin that would 
remain with the traders to compensate them for the transaction costs of buying the animals 
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and delivering them to the schools/health centres. From discussions with key stakeholders, it 
transpired that the price was set at this relatively high level because of the high market prices 
in December, when the LSP did assessments throughout the district. Many traders wanted 
the price to be KES 900–950 for the livestock producers but many stakeholders even felt 
the reduced price of KES 800 was too high. Ultimately, the price of KES 800 was seen as a 
good way to introduce pastoralists to the market. In the same spirit, it was argued by various 
stakeholders that the price offered to the goat producers during the destocking should be 
higher than the market prices in order to motivate them to sell. In the following paragraphs, 
the price offered for goats during the off-take (and perception of the real prices received) are 
compared with the market prices (of shoats) that were gathered from various sources.
Table 3. Goat purchasing transactions and traders involved in TELO by zones
Zone
Sum of 
goats pur-
chased
Count of
transactions
Count of
traders
Average
goats/
transac-
tion
Average
transac-
tion/
trader
Average
goats/
trader
Count of traders 
that traded >10 
goats
Central 1625 1048 161 1.6 7 10 31 19%
Lake Zone 1140 356 65 3.2 5 18 46 71%
Northwest 1058 313 25 3.4 13 42 22 88%
South 2513 894 85 2.8 11 30 61 72%
Overall 6336 2611 336 2.4 8 19
3.1.3 Comparison of prices paid during intervention to average market 
prices
Market prices for goats in Turkana
In order to calculate the price of goats in Turkana around the time of the destocking 
intervention, three data sources were utilized: ALRMP household surveys data, VSF-B market 
monitoring data, and qualitative data from the FGDs conducted as part of this evaluation. 
Findings from this data are presented hereafter. ALRMP, directed from the Offi ce of the 
President of Kenya, has been surveying 30 households per month in Turkana for many 
consecutive years. Over the years, this has cumulated into an impressive database, which 
includes animal sales and the prices received at household level from these actual sales. 
From this database, average prices received for actual transactions in the months before, 
during, and after the destocking interventions were extracted and are presented in Table 4. 
It is noteworthy that the prices presented above are probably farm-gate prices (adakar level) 
as they were gathered from households that occasionally sell an animal. In some parts of 
the district, there are middlemen operating at the adakar level who will pay a lower price 
than they expect to receive at secondary markets, where they subsequently sell them on. In 
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other instances, particularly in those areas were there are no local markets, the pastoralists 
trek their animals to the nearest market. As most transactions in these local markets involve 
one-on-one negotiations between the pastoralists and the traders, the pastoralist often remain 
unaware of the prevailing market prices, hence receive a rather low price—similar to the 
farm-gate price.
Table 4. Average prices (KES) of goats in actual transactions in Turkana District
Month/year Mean N Std. dev.
Sep-04 577 217 231
Oct-04 543 195 192
Nov-04 607 220 272
Dec-04 598 145 240
Jan-05 585 190 249
Feb-05 651 202 244
Mar-05 672 217 476
Apr-05 566 236 205
May-05 578 213 224
Source: ALRMP database (2006).
In an attempt to promote the collection of market information, VSF-Belgium has been 
working with voluntary market monitors at the local sell-yards they helped institutionalize. 
Unfortunately, due to logistical constraints, and working with volunteers, this data had 
periodic ‘gaps’, but it was very interesting and useful all the same. Table 5 presents some data 
on market attendance and prices gathered for Kalemunyang and Kerio, which are typically 
secondary markets away from the main transport axes through the district. Unfortunately, the 
records from Kerio were only retrieved for the month of September 2004, where the average 
price was comparable to that of Kalemunyang. The highest prices at the markets occur in the 
holiday season of December, when Borana traders come to Turkana to buy goats. 
Lastly, in the FGDs held with LMA traders and livestock owners, perceptions were sought for 
the price of goats at different markets, namely, from purchases at the farm gate (adakar village 
level), and through the market chain via secondary and main markets to terminal markets 
such as Nairobi. The information gathered through these exercises is captured in Table 6.
It can be seen from Table 6 that farm gate (adakar level) prices for goats ranged from KES 
300 to KES 1000 (disregarding the information gathered from traders in Kalemnarok, which 
the evaluation team believed was exaggerated), assuming that KES 300 is the lowest paid 
for a grade 3 goat and KES 1000 is the highest price paid for a grade 1 goat. At secondary 
markets, traders try to buy goats at prices comparable to farm-gate prices—i.e. up to KES 
1000—and sell them on for up to KES 1500. At main markets, goats are bought for between 
KES 650–1800 and are sold for between KES 1000–2500. A little mark-up can be earned by 
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livestock owners when selling directly at the local market, but only by those who know how 
to negotiate a better deal based on their awareness of market prices. At the adakar level, 
there is very little knowledge of the prices at both main and terminal markets. Ironically, the 
pastoralists who seemed best informed about prices at the main markets were those that, 
due to the virtual absence of a local market or even middlemen, have to trek their animals to 
Lodwar or Kakuma (main markets) in order to sell them.
Table 5. VSF-B market monitors’ data on goat market sizes and prices (KES)
Kalemunyang
No. of daily 
records 
(sample)
Averages from the daily records kept by market monitors
No. of 
traders
No. of 
goats sold
Price of goats
Lowest Average Highest
Sept-04 n=30 days 15 23 612 1086 1560
Oct-04 n=31 days 27 52 532 1039 1545
Nov-04 n=30 days 32 55 530 1053 1576
Dec-04 n=31 days 18 51 498 1081 1663
Jan-05 n=30 days 19 58 470 985 1500
Feb-05 n=18 days 20 42 775 911 1046
March-05 n=31days 21 46 832 1076 1320
April-05 n=30 days 24 30 842 1105 1368
May-05 n=31 days 24 53 900 1119 1339
June-05 n=30 days 31 50 1276 1482 1688
July-05 n=31 days 32 39 764 1013 1262
Kerio
Sept-04 n=30 days – 22 541 1090 2021
Note: The average prices for Kalemunyang (presented in small italics) are not based on the data but are the 
simple average of the average lowest plus average highest prices. They were added as an indicator.
With regard to the main markets in Turkana (Lokichoggio, Kakuma, Lodwar, Lokichar), 
there seemed to be little variations in prices. Presumably most goats traded are for local 
consumption so the distance to ‘terminal’ markets (Eldoret, Nakuru and Nairobi) is not really 
refl ected in the prices.
Synthesis of information on prices
When comparing the 3 sources of information on goat prices in Turkana, it can be assumed 
that ALRMP prices (average KES 600) appear to be farm gate prices for average goats, i.e. 
grade 2 goats. The lowest, average and highest prices collected by VSF-B market monitors at 
secondary markets (year averages: KES 675/1085/1440) can be interpreted as the prices for 
grade 3, grade 2 and grade 1 goats, respectively. From the qualitative information gathered, 
the evaluation team understands that the farm gate (or household level) price for goats can be 
as low as KES 300. 
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Since traders are not interested in buying weak or thin goats, it can be concluded that KES 
300 is the lowest price paid for grade 3 goats. This conclusion was generally supported by 
the FGDs undertaken. In two LMA FGDs, traders indicated that the lowest price paid for 
weak and thin goats was as low as KES 200, but more often it was stressed that nobody was 
interested in buying such weak goats.
Prices received by goat owners and margin received by traders
In the initiation phase of the project, traders and communities were sensitized to the kind 
of animals that were to be purchased and the price that should be paid, namely: drought 
effected (weak), mature, healthy goats for which the goat owners (at adakar level) would 
receive KES 800 from the traders. After delivery to the schools, and completion of all relevant 
documentation (including slaughter date), traders received KES 1000, paid by cheque, for 
each goat. Hence the margin for the traders was KES 200 per goat.
However, in 2 out of 3 adakar FGDs with pastoralists that benefi ted from the project, it was 
pointed out that the goat owners had received less than KES 800 for their goats sold as part of 
the destocking intervention. This is confi rmed by the TELO fi eld data in Table 7. Remarkably, 
the Southern Zone witnessed more cases where goat owners received less than they were 
supposed to according to the strict guidelines laid down by VSF-Belgium. Remarkably, the 
traders purchasing goats in this zone did not even try to mask this in the documentation of 
their transactions. It is possible that pastoralists in the Southern Region were less sensitized to 
the guidelines laid down by VSF-Belgium, or perhaps traders in other regions were just better 
at manipulating their records.
Table 7. Cases of over- and under-payments for goats recorded in TELO fi eld data
Zone No. of owners sellers Underpaid cases* Overpaid cases**
Central 1044 41 4% 4 0%
Lake Zone 355 31 9% 25 7%
Northwest 310 30 10% 57 18
South 856 333 39% 44 5%
* Cases where a price less than KES 800 was paid.
** Cases where a price more than KES 800 was paid. 
According to VSF-Belgium’s guidelines, traders were to receive a margin of KES 200 for every 
goat delivered to a predetermined school or health centre. Apparently, LMA traders had tried 
to negotiate better deals for themselves. Indeed, during a FGD, one LMA group admitted 
having varied the prices depending on negotiations: ‘some goats bought at KES 700’. They 
argued that this was to cater for the fact that some goats died before delivering them to 
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the schools. The occurrence of traders paying prices higher prices (> KES 800) was also 
documented in the forms traders had to fi ll in during the destocking exercise. This was the 
case in nearly one fi fth (18%) of the goat purchases in the Northwest Zone.
In all LMA FGDs, traders indicated wanting a higher margin if they were to be involved in 
future destocking exercises. A recurring problem mentioned in every interview was that they 
had working capital invested in this activity for quite some time (varying from 1 week to 1 
month) until they were refunded by banking their cheques. Hence, they incurred travel costs 
to Lodwar and the bank charge for cashing the cheque (KES 300 for a cheque of < KES 10 
thousand or less than 10 goats sold). Therefore, they suggested the price should be KES 1500 
to the traders, of which KES 1000 would be for the adakar producers.
Remarkably, in the 3rd FGD with an adakar that benefi ted from the destocking intervention, 
pastoralist producers received the full KES 1000. This was because there are no middlemen or 
traders in their area, so the pastoralists sold their goats straight to the local schools.
Comparison of destocking and ‘market’ price for weak and thin goat
A price of KES 800 paid to the livestock owners for weak and thin goats may well be four 
times their true ‘market’ value (suggested to be KES 200). Such a high price endowed 
traders with signifi cant bargaining power, and many livestock owners—destitute or at least 
vulnerable by the time this intervention came along—were willing to accept a lower price.
3.2 Understanding the destocking process
Identifi cation of external drivers
With regard to the destocking intervention in January/February 2005, the lack of water and 
pasture in the district resulted from an ensuing drought. In addition, growing herd sizes 
(partly due to improved animal health care) and increased competition for water and good 
pastoral land, from agro-pastoralists, also contributed to restricting the amount of water and 
pasture/browse available per goat, camel and donkey. The problem was particularly acute 
for goats, camels and donkeys, as cattle had migrated to areas with available grazing and 
water resources. The problem was identifi ed by a range of key actors closely involved with 
pastoralist livelihood systems in Turkana, namely, the pastoralist communities themselves, 
Arid Lands via its ‘Early Warning System’ (ALRMP Bulletins), Oxfam-GB via its Nutritional 
Survey Report, the British NGO Merlin via its health survey, the World Food Programme 
via an emergency report, and Turkana’s District Steering Group (DSG) via its ‘Report of the 
Assessment of Livestock Body Conditions at Northwestern, Lake and Central regions for off-
take targeting’. 
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Compiled for the DSG, the Report was based on an extensive fi eld assessment conducted 
by four key offi cials representing Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP), 
VSF-Belgium, the District Livestock Marketing Council (DLMC), and the District Livestock 
Production Offi ce (DLPO). All offi cials were members of the DSG’s technical support group 
called the ‘Livestock Service Providers’ (LSP) forum comprising VSF-Belgium, the District 
Veterinary Offi cer (DVO), the District Livestock Production Offi cer (DLPO), the District 
Commissioner, AMREF, Oxfam-GB, private vets, Arid Lands, Intermediate Technology 
Development Group (ITDG), and the Indigenous Vegetation Programme (IVP). The report was 
based on a rapid, yet relatively comprehensive, qualitative assessment undertaken, between 
7th and 12th January 2005, to evaluate the growing severity of the drought situation on the 
ground and to update the previous situation report. Key parameters were assessed to estimate 
the severity of the drought across the areas outlined above. These parameters were: 
browse and pasture situation;• 
body condition of livestock; • 
approximate percentage of weak animals; • 
expected price for weak goats; • 
current price for strong goats; • 
concentration of livestock; • 
water availability and; • 
schools in the area that could benefi t from livestock off-take. • 
In addition, the team compiled a list of schools deemed eligible for free goat meat, agreed 
the start date and duration of destocking and developed key recommendations. The LSP 
also set the price to be paid for weak but healthy goats. Many traders consulted during the 
process demanded KES 900–950, but the price was deemed too high and so the LSP reduced 
it to KES 800—a fi gure that many also felt was still too high but it was seen as a good way to 
introduce pastoralists to the market. In contrast, when ITDG undertook its destocking activity, 
between March and August 2005, they agreed to use the same rate of KES 800. However, 
ITDG believed that KES 800 was a deterrent to market integration. After consultation with 
pastoralists, ITDG determined that pastoralists required KES 1000–1200 as an incentive 
to sell their goats. In addition, the LSP also determined that, in order to have the desired 
impact, 10% of the goat population in the worst hit areas would need to be destocked; this 
was twice the amount of goats that it was possible to destock given the intervention’s limited 
budget. The LSP assessment targeted 20 centres for destocking, expanded to 29 centres, 
close to the selected schools and health centres. At that time, most of the key actors involved 
in pastoralist systems in Turkana believed, in the words of VSF-Belgium, that ‘the need was 
dictated by the weather and that the timing seemed right for now’. This expression of need 
was directly corroborated by the WFP report, produced at the same time. 
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Internal drivers and key actors 
By this time, internal drivers emerged, namely, in the form of Arid Land’s Support to Local 
Development Coordinator, who was also part of the DSG. Supported by the World Bank, 
Arid Lands secured fi nancial resources for a livestock intervention in the worst hit areas 
of Turkana—those that were identifi ed in the LSP report. However, even though key arid 
land’s personnel were able to secure some fi nancial support for an intervention, funds were 
extremely limited. The total budget allocated for an intervention was KES 9 million. Twice as 
much money would have been required to meet the 10% off-take target set by the LSP for the 
worst hit areas. 
Selection of intervention 
Several possible interventions were discussed by the DSG, including the provision of water, 
and the subsidized transportation of goats from Turkana to Nairobi. According to both Arid 
Lands and VSF-Belgium, after a cost-effectiveness evaluation of potential options, and the 
problems of the previous subsidized transportation intervention still fresh in LSP members’ 
minds, a limited destocking program, operationalized only in the worst hit areas, was seen 
as the only feasible and most straight forward option. Once destocking had been chosen as 
the most appropriate intervention, discussions began regarding the design of the intervention. 
Arid Lands did suggest that the intervention might seek to destock weak but healthy goats 
and fatten them up until they were in reasonable condition to eat and then give them away 
to schools and health centres. Unfortunately, funds were not available to buy animal feed. 
In addition, this option would also have needed to address serious logistical problems/
constraints, namely, where to keep the goats, and how to transport them etc. Ultimately, 
Arid Lands and the DSG decided that the most effi cient use of resources would be achieved 
by destocking weak but healthy goats and trekking them to schools and health centres for 
immediate slaughter and consumption.
Mobilization of destocking intervention in Turkana District
Once the DSG had taken the decision to destock, Arid Lands were asked to seek proposals 
from institutions to organize and supervise the intervention. Ultimately, the money secured 
for destocking in 2004–2005 was put out for competitive tender. Four organizations tendered 
for the destocking project, including the DLMC, ITDG and VSF-Belgium. Whilst VSF-
Belgium was not initially keen to undertake destocking, possibly due to VSF-Belgium’s mixed 
experiences with its 2001 destocking intervention or the fact that part of the destocking 
was scheduled to take place in areas not usually part of their operational area, Arid Lands 
persuaded VSF-Belgium that it was the most suitable institution for the intervention. 
22
Enrolment
Enrolment is the term used to encapsulate the collective deliberation of the most appropriate 
form of action to take. As it can be seen from the section above, most of the key actors 
involved in characterizing the drought and the severity and geography of ensuing shortage 
of water and pasture, as well as the knock-on effects of this in relation to the deterioration of 
livestock condition and potential pastoralist food security concerns, were key development 
and emergency intervention actors. By defi ning the problem collaboratively, and having 
experience of successfully working together in the past, these key development actors were 
able to derive a durable consensus on how and where to secure fi nancial resources for an 
intervention; the most appropriate way forward, and; on the most sensible divisions of labour. 
At the strategic level, there is a substantial amount of evidence that supports the highly 
inclusive and collaborative role of the DSG and LSP as a proactive umbrella group for 
development actors in Turkana. Most of the principal development actors in the district were 
extremely supportive of its role and were satisfi ed that the group provided a forum for them 
to air their own concerns, and that their concerns would be taken into full consideration. 
On so many occasions, the ultimate goal of a lead institution is thwarted by the actions or 
inactions of institutions, which are more peripheral actors, yet are crucial to the successful 
implementation of a particular intervention. It was refreshing to hear that, while still at a 
strategic level, more peripheral actors, such as the District Public Health Offi cer, 30 meat 
inspectors, and the District Education Offi cer (responsible for writing letters to head masters), 
cooperated fully and worked together towards the project’s aims. Only the District Public 
Health Offi cial failed to visit the fi eld, although there was money for him to do so.
However, whilst there is much supportive evidence of the committed enrolment of strategic 
actors in the destocking project, the process of enrolling key actors at the ground level met 
with mixed results. Key actors on the ground include: 
Livestock Market Associations (LMAs); • 
Livestock traders; • 
Livestock Off-take Community Committees; • 
Market Monitors; • 
Pastoralists; • 
Head teachers and; • 
Health centre managers. • 
Conversely, with the odd exception, the enrolment of key actants including goats, water, 
pasture and goat diseases, was highly successful.
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3.2.1 Role of pastoralists
Mobilization of the destocking intervention refers to operationalizing the destocking program 
designed by DSG and VSF-Belgium. While there is evidence that key elders, particularly 
chiefs, of pastoralist communities provided the LSP assessment team with key information 
used to formulate the destocking intervention, there is no evidence that they consulted with 
the members of their respective adakars or had any real formative role in the participatory 
design of the intervention. Much of the evidence outlined below pays testament to the fact 
that not only were pastoralists simply assigned roles within the destocking project, but many 
pastoralists also remained totally oblivious to the destocking intervention, or at least were 
unaware of the role that they, and other key actors, were expected to play.
Ultimately, 3212 pastoralists were suggested to have benefi ted from the destocking 
intervention. However, detailed analysis of the TELO fi eld data suggests that total number 
of pastoralists involved in the intervention was only 2565. A stratifi ed sampling frame was 
developed to generate qualitative fi eld-level data from three of the four areas in which VSF-
Belgium operated. Within each area, adakars located within 20 km of major arterial roads 
were selected on a pseudo-random basis, i.e. VSF-Belgium assisted in the identifi cation 
and organization of pastoralists for FGDs in order to determine their experiences during the 
destocking intervention. The purpose of FGDs was to validate key claims made by the TELO 
Report, namely: 1) Appropriate awareness raising was accomplished, particularly amongst 
the most vulnerable pastoralists and livestock owners, and; 2) All pastoralists received the 
agreed KES 800 per goat. In addition, pastoralists were asked whether or not they thought 
that the destocking intervention was a good idea and, if they saw the need, how a future 
destocking activity could be improved. Focus Group Discussions were conducted in fi ve 
adakars in fi ve areas of Turkana (Kalemngorok, Kaleng, Lokichar, Kerio and Lorugum). 
Kalemnarok
In the Kalemnarok area, 25 pastoralists represented four separate adakars: Kakongu 
(comprising 500 households, a distance of 18 km from Kainuk); Lochoresekon (comprising 
250 households, a distance of 25 km from Kainuk); Kangirega and; Nawoyaregae. 
Traditionally, pastoralists in Kakongu kept cows, the most important animal, then goats, 
camels and donkeys. In Lochoresekon, goats were the most important livestock as they were 
quick to reproduce and easy to sell. In Kangirega, camels were the most important livestock 
as they can be milked fi ve times per day from four teats, giving two families two teats each. 
Lastly, pastoralists in Nawoyaregae concentrated on the production of big male goats and 
cattle. Not surprisingly, drought was identifi ed as the key livestock related problem faced by 
the pastoralists.
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Kaleng
In the Kaleng area, 15 pastoralists represented the Kanukurdio adakar, comprising 400 
households. Goats were the principal livestock produced in this adakar, with a few donkeys 
and camels. When probed about cattle, the group members responded that they used to 
keep cattle until 1980, when they lost all of them during a severe drought. Again, drought 
was identifi ed as the key livestock related problem faced by the pastoralists, specifi cally the 
associated lack of pasture and livestock pests and diseases.
Lokichar
Pastoralists represented an adakar to the east of Lokichar. Again, goats were their principal 
livestock species, with camels second and donkeys third most important. Drought was also 
identifi ed as the key livestock related problem faced by the pastoralist, followed by insecurity 
and livestock diseases.
Kerio
In the Kerio area, 6 pastoralists represented four adakars: Achamee (3 pastoralists 
representing 13 households), Namide (1 pastoralist representing 150 households), 
Nagololkatwon (1 pastoralist representing 200 households) and Emong (1 pastoralist 
representing 120 households). Many households, particularly those from the smallest adakars 
(Achamee and Emong) only kept goats. One of the elders suggested that this was the result 
of ‘not having received a dowry for such a long time’. Other much bigger adakars kept 
camels and donkeys as well as goats. Drought was also identifi ed as the key livestock related 
problem, specifi cally a lack of pasture and an increase in livestock pests and diseases.
Lorugum
Seven pastoralists represented the Lougogo adakar in the Lorugum area. Pastoralists kept 
mostly goats with a few camels and donkeys. They stated that there was not suffi cient grass in 
the area for cattle. Again, drought, specifi cally lack of pasture and associated diseases, was 
identifi ed as the key livestock related problem.
3.2.1.1 Awareness raising and the role in adakars in destocking intervention
According to VSF-Belgium’s records, community dialogue meetings were held in all 29 
buying centres. Community dialogue meetings were the central mechanism by which target 
communities were sensitized to the destocking intervention and a forum through which target 
communities could actively participate. It was at these meetings that 108 LOCC offi cials 
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were elected. Their role was to ensure that pastoralists and their children benefi ted from the 
project. One interesting point to note is that, in the awareness raising meetings, the objectives 
of the intervention and the allotted role of pastoralists was only explained to a small number 
of pastoralists. According to the FGDs undertaken with pastoralists, it is not clear whether or 
not all adakars in the area were represented at the awareness raising meetings and whether 
attendees actually relayed information to all the members of their respective adakars.
Pastoralists and the sale of goats
In all, nine out of a total of eleven adakars represented in the FGDs, indicated that they had 
sold goats as part of the 2005 destocking intervention. In Kerio, representatives from all four 
adakars had been sensitized to the destocking intervention, and the stringent operational 
guidelines of the implementing agency, through a local barasa. Indeed, one man claimed that 
after trekking to the market with a large herd of goats he was only allowed to sell 1 goat and 
was obliged to return with the rest. 
However, whilst it later transpired that a barasa had been held in Kalemngorok, 
representatives from the four adakars indicated that they were unaware of the local barasa 
and had been informed by local traders about the demand for weak goats. Traders informed 
them to return with weak goats after two days, and that each goat would be purchased for 
KES 1000. However, according to the pastoralists interviewed, many traders only offered 
prices ranging from KES 300 to 700. 
While pastoralists from the Kanukurdio adakar (Kaleng) were actively involved in the 2005 
destocking intervention, they informed the evaluation team that they were only one of two 
local adakars, out of a total of 100 adakars, which actually sold goats. However, TELO fi eld 
data does not corroborate this as 5 names of adakars were listed. Pastoralists, who were 
sensitized to the destocking intervention by the local market monitor, suggested that only 
adakars close to the two local boreholes had been targeted by the destocking intervention. 
According to the pastoralists present, each household from Kanukurdio adakar sold one goat. 
However, they later stated that adakar members sold only 60 goats (confi rmed by TELO fi eld 
data) in total as part of the destocking intervention, and not the 400 goats at the rate of one 
per household.
Conversely, while pastoralists from the Lokichar adakar acknowledged that they were 
cognizant that VSF-Belgium was active in the area during the destocking intervention, they 
were not sensitized to the fact that could have sold their weak goats at the time, even though 
they had plenty of weak goats and would have been more than willing to participate. Indeed, 
FGD respondents fi rst heard of weak animals being consumed by local schools. When 
asked if they had gone to inquire about the program, pastoralists replied they had not. While 
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pastoralists from this adakar were unaware of any of their households selling goats as part of 
the destocking intervention, they acknowledged that they may have inadvertently sold goats 
at the market without being aware of the intervention. Several respondents stated that they 
had happily received KES 600 during the destocking intervention period but had not realized 
why. 
Lastly, pastoralists representing the Lougogo adakar (Lorugum) were totally unaware of VSF-
Belgium’s destocking activities in their area during January and February 2005.
3.2.1.2 Number of goats sold and prices received
According to the TELO Report, of the KES 1000 paid for each goat slaughtered, KES 800 was 
paid to the livestock owner and KES 200 was paid to the livestock trader to cover the cost of 
moving the goats to a pre-arranged slaughter site. According to the TELO Report, this price 
breakdown was explained during the awareness creation community meetings and accepted 
by all stakeholders. In order to ensure that the benefi ts of destocking were spread throughout 
a large number of vulnerable livestock owners within the target areas, the number of goats 
purchased from any single person was limited to just one.
However, according to the data generated during FGDs, the prices paid for goats and the 
process of buying and selling goats varied considerably between locations. For example, 
adakar members from Kalemnarok suggested that they had received payments ranging from 
KES 300 and KES 700. According to Table 7, pastoralists from Kalemnarok were not the only 
ones to be underpaid for their goats. Indeed, detailed analysis of the TELO fi eld data suggests 
that 333 individuals representing 39% of pastoralists in the ‘South Region’ of Turkana were 
underpaid. Whilst unsure about the numbers of goats sold by their fellow adakar members, of 
those who attended the FGD, one sold 2 goats, another sold 6 goats, and a third one sold 10 
goats. Whilst these numbers can in no way be seen as representative of all pastoralists in the 
South Region, it is interesting to compare the numbers above against the statistical average of 
2.95 goats sold per person in Table 2. 
In Kaleng, due to the lack of a local market and livestock traders, adakar members were 
paid the full KES 1000 for each of the 60 goats sold—a good price according to adakar 
members. Adakar members also trekked the goats to the local schools where they were later 
slaughtered and consumed. 
In Kerio, adakar members were also told that they would receive KES 800 per goat. In reality, 
FGD members stated that they only received between KES 350 and KES 500 for the 100 or 
more goats sold. This was not consistent with VSF-Belgium’s fi eld data summarized in Table 
7, which suggests that only 4% or 41 pastoralists were underpaid in the whole of the Central 
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Zone. Indeed, this fi gure is even more surprising when one considers that pastoralists in the 
Kerio FGD represented four adakars and, allegedly, a total of 483 households. Even so, there 
was such interest in the destocking intervention that goats were over supplied and had to be 
trekked back to their respective adakars. All adakar members present stated that they would 
have been happy with the KES 800 as it was a high price for such weak goats, which, under 
usual circumstances, would almost have been impossible to sell due to their poor condition. 
Indeed, elders from the four Kerio adakars complained to the chairman of the local LMA. 
When they failed to reach a satisfactory agreement, adakar members suspended their supply 
of goats destined for consumption as part of the destocking intervention at the end of the 
second week of the three week off-take period. When questioned, ‘Where did the LMA 
members buy their fi nal consignment of goats?’, FGD members replied ‘perhaps from their 
own herds’. 
3.2.1.3 Benefi ts of the destocking intervention
Only half of the adakar representatives provided an answer to this question. In Kaleng 
Division, the respondents stated that destocking during drought conditions was a good idea. 
This sentiment was also echoed in Kerio. Respondents suggested that, before the emergence 
of the cash-economy, they kept weak animals until they died and then eat the meat. Now, 
when they are paid a good price to destock weak animals, they have the fi nancial resources 
to restock at a later date. According to the TELO Report (2005), a principal output of 
destocking was to ‘increase income at the household level among pastoralists’. This was 
based on the key assumption that the ‘livestock that would have died are sold and money 
used for basic needs by pastoralists’ (TELO Report 2005). Again, only two of the four adakars 
benefi ting from the destocking intervention were willing to share information regarding how 
they used their additional income. Pastoralists from Kaleng informed the FGD that the money 
generated through the destocking intervention had been used to buy food (maize fl our), 
while pastoralists from Kerio insisted that they had used the money to restock when the long 
rains arrived.
3.2.1.4 Lessons learned and improvements
Whilst, in many respects, pastoralists felt that the destocking exercise had been a success, 
particularly its timing, members of the fi ve FGDs suggested several improvements that should 
be made in order to improve the effectiveness of future destocking interventions. First, FGD 
pastoralists felt strongly about the need for a fair price per goat in future destocking activities. 
Respondents from the Kalemnarok and Kerio Divisions believed that KES 1000 was a fair 
price. Pastoralists from Kerio justifi ed their claim by stating that ‘KES 1000 is enough to buy 
2 goats for restocking’. Pastoralists from Lokichar were slightly less ambitious suggesting that 
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they required KES 900 as an incentive to destock. Pastoralists from the Lokichar Division 
went a little further by justifying their claim for KES 900. They suggested that, under normal 
circumstances, they kept weak animals until they died. Goats would be kept until they 
were very weak in the hope that rains would arrive and the goats would regain condition. 
If the rains failed to arrive, the goats would have lost so much condition they would be 
unmarketable. However, if an external institution arrives in the area and wants to buy their 
goats, pastoralists register this as demand for their goats and insist on a fair price. Pastoralists 
stated that ‘when you want to buy them, KES 900 is the price you’ll have to bring’. They 
reiterated that ‘we love our goats until they die’. After prompting about the pastoralists’ 
admissions of accepting lower prices (KES 600) for their stock, the pastoralists replied that 
‘they accepted KES 600 only because of the need at that time’. Goats are perceived as the 
pastoralists’ mobile banks. If there is a drought, and they’re desperate, they’ll consider selling 
but they still want a proper price. Second, FGD members from Kalemnarok suggested that 
the destocking intervention would have been better for them if off-take had been a one-
off event (one day). Third, FGD members from Kalemnarok and Kerio suggested that the 
intervention would have been more equitable for them if goats had been sold directly to 
VSF-Belgium. Members from Kerio stated that ‘the LMA traders were themselves hungry 
for money’. Fourth, members from Kalemnarok suggested that the intervention should have 
destocked 75% of their weak animals. Fifth, members from both the Kalemnarok and Kerio 
FGDs suggested that other animals, particularly cattle and camels, should also be considered 
for future off-take interventions. 
3.2.2 Role of livestock traders
During the enrolment process, VSF-Belgium Market Monitors were sent out to the 29 off-
take centres. Their principal purpose was to enrol LMAs into the destocking intervention 
and, in turn, for them to enrol their livestock trader members. From the evidence reviewed, 
it is apparent that, whilst many of the key LMA actors and local traders were aware of VSF-
Belgium and its activities, and that many had good working and personal relationships with 
VSF-Belgium staff, it appears as though LMAs and their members were simply assigned 
roles within the project rather than successfully enrolled. In most instances, it appears that 
LMAs, and their trader members, were assigned a set number of goats to purchase at a 
predetermined price, and were informed that they should only buy one weak healthy goat 
from each pastoralist to deliver them to predetermined centres (schools and health centres) 
where they would be slaughtered and consumed. Their principal incentives to play a part 
assigned to them by the DSG and VSF-Belgium, was, a KES 200 commission on every goat 
bought and supplied to their respective goat receiving institutions; maintenance of good 
relations with VSF-Belgium (a NGO whose past and present activities were benefi ting them), 
and; to a greater or lesser extent, civic pride. 
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In all, 523 livestock traders were suggested to have benefi ted from the 2005 destocking 
intervention. Detailed analysis of the TELO fi eld data suggests that this fi gure is not accurate. 
According to the evaluation team’s analysis of VSF-Belgium’s fi eld data (Table 3), a total 
of 336 traders, buying an average of 19 goats, were involved in the 2005 destocking 
intervention. Again, a stratifi ed sampling frame was developed to generate market level 
data from 5 of the 29 off-take centres in three of the four zones in which VSF-Belgium 
operated. Within each zone, members of Livestock Market Associations (LMAs) were 
selected on a pseudo-random basis for FGDs and VSF-Belgium assisted in the identifi cation 
and organization of traders in order to determine their experiences during the destocking 
intervention. The purpose of FGDs was to validate key claims made by the TELO Report, 
namely: 1) the number of goats bought per trader; 2) impacts on market prices and volumes, 
both before, during and after the destocking intervention and; 3) impact on livestock trading 
businesses. In addition, livestock traders were asked whether or not they thought that the 
destocking intervention was a good idea and, if they saw the need, how a future destocking 
activity could be improved. Focus Group Discussions were conducted in fi ve market centres 
in fi ve Divisions of Turkana (Kalemngorok, Lokichar, Kerio, Lorugum and Lodwar).
In Kalemnarok, 5 members of the local LMA took part in the FGD. In Lokichar, a total of 
40 LMA members took part in the FGD. In Kerio, 7 LMA members took part in the FGD. In 
Lorugum, 7 men and 4 women took part in the FGD. Lastly, 7 LMA members took part in 
the Lodwar FGD (including the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and Treasurer). In addition, 
the Chairman of the Lodwar LMA was also the Treasurer of the District Livestock Market 
Association (DLMC). All fi ve of the LMAs were involved in the January/February 2005 
destocking intervention.
3.2.2.1 Number of goats bought per trader and prices paid
According to the TELO Report, traders purchased goats at the predetermined price of KES 
800. In Kalemnarok, traders stated that the amount of goats purchased by each trader varied 
depending on the schools that they supplied. They suggested that some traders bought and 
sold 10 goats, while others bought and sold 12, 13, 14 goats. These fi gures are consistent 
with the summarized statistics presented in Table 3, which suggests that 72% of traders 
in the South Zone, or a total of 61 traders, purchased more than ten goats. With regard to 
the purchase price, Kalemnarok traders stated that it depended on individual negotiations 
with sellers; some traders openly admitted that they paid as little as KES 700, while other 
suggested that they had even paid up to KES 850 or KES 900. This evidence corroborates that 
generated through the FGD with pastoralists from Kalemnarok. 
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In Lokichar, only one trader out of the 40 traders present had actually purchased goats 
during the destocking intervention. Coincidentally, the individual involved also happened 
to be the LMA Chairperson. The Chairperson, however, informed the FGD that a total of 
20 LMA members had purchased 300 goats, averaging 15 goats per trader. This assertion is 
supported by TELO fi eld data, which states that 21 traders purchased 321 goats. Traders in 
Lokichar suggested that they bought goats every day for 4 weeks. However, traders were not 
forthcoming about whether or not they had paid the set price of KES 800 per goat. 
In Kerio, the FGD determined that 15 traders bought between 9 and 11 goats each over 
a period of three weeks—a total of 141–161 goats. This assertion is broadly supported by 
TELO fi eld data, which states that 11 traders purchased 186 goats. The intervention’s market 
monitor insisted that sellers were paid the set KES 800, as they were aware of the agreed 
price. In addition, the market monitor also stated that the local LMA traders were not pleased 
with the price. 
In Lorugum, the local LMA decided to ‘share the workload’. According to responses obtained 
during the FGD, each trader bought 5 goats at KES 800 giving an individual total profi t of 
KES 1000. This assertion is not supported by TELO fi eld data, which states that 25 traders 
purchased 280 goats—11.2 per trader. Interestingly, one LMA member insisted that traders 
were instructed to buy ‘female thin goats’ that were weak but healthy that usually fetched 
KES 200. 
In Lodwar, it was diffi cult to reach a consensus of how many goats each trader was allotted to 
buy and sell. In total, 500 goats were bought and sold; working on current LMA membership, 
each trader would be allotted less than two goats on average. When re-probed, LMA 
members responded by saying that they ‘grouped members’. For example, 5 traders would 
be asked to purchase 50 goats for one school averaging 10 goats per trader. This assertion 
is not supported by TELO fi eld data, which states that only 30 traders, out of a total of 300 
LMA members, purchased a total of 269 goats averaging 8.9 per trader. However, the group 
did state that many of their members had very little money and therefore did not have the 
capacity to purchase many goats.
3.2.2.2 Effect of destocking on market prices, volumes and attendance
Market prices
Only Lodwar LMA members commented on the impact of the destocking intervention on 
prices. They explained that, while the KES 800 offered as part of the off-take process was a 
good price in November, by January/February 2005, after the short rains and concomitant re-
growth of grass pastures, the market price for healthy goats was actually higher than the price 
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offered by VSF-Belgium. This explanation is corroborated by market price data presented in 
Tables 4, 5 and 6. However, aside from periods of prolonged drought, weak goats are not 
usually offered for sale. This meant that the sale of weak goats, to all intent and purposes, 
was a parallel market relatively unaffected by the growing buoyancy in the market for higher 
grade goats. Indeed, one FGD member indicated that, at the time of off-take, weak goats 
brought to the market were only fetching KES 200. Ultimately, the group consensus was that 
the destocking activity had not impacted, either negatively or positively, on Lodwar market 
prices.
Market volumes
According to LMAs members, the effect of the destocking intervention on market volumes 
was generally positive. As expected, all LMAs reported that market volumes increased during 
the off-take intervention even as the market monitor from Kerio stated, ‘the volumes of the 
destocking activity were negligible’. In concert with comments of Lodwar LMA members’ 
(above), he stated that the off-take intervention ‘only assisted to take away the weak animals 
that otherwise would have been left at home’. However, LMA members from Kalemnarok, 
Lodwar and Lorugum acknowledged that the off-take intervention not only increased market 
volumes during the destocking period, but that market volumes remained high throughout 
March and April. 
Market attendance
According to LMA FGDs, the effect of the destocking intervention on market attendance 
was also positive. LMA members from Kalemnarok, Lodwar and Lorugum acknowledged 
that market attendance improved as a direct result of the intervention. As one LMA member 
from Kalemnarok stated, ‘it really motivated sellers from adakars to come to the market’. This 
holds true at least for a period of two months after the intervention ended and the high price 
offered for weak goats (KES 800) reverted back to the usual price of KES 200. Another LMA 
member from Lorugum stated that the off-take intervention was a ‘positive spin-off’ and that 
‘many sellers were now bringing goats to the market’. A Lodwar LMA member went further 
by suggesting that ‘everybody was trying to destock, even those that were not used to the 
market, and some are still coming’. This member went on to say that the additional livestock 
volumes, and increased attendance of sellers, encouraged new traders to ‘come and do 
business and become members of the LMA’. 
3.2.2.3 Impact on livestock trading businesses
LMA members from Kerio, Lokichar and Lodwar stated that, as the volumes of stock involved 
in the destocking intervention were so small, traders were able to continue with business as 
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usual. Although Lodwar LMA members admitted that, for at least one week, they dedicated 
most of their time to buying weak animals for this off-take activity. Whilst there was no record 
of a response to this question in the FGD transcripts, given the response below, it is likely that 
LMA members from Kalemnarok were also able to continue with their usual livestock trading 
business. However, this was explicitly not the case in Lorugum where traders suggested that 
the off-take intervention tied up their working capital and reduced their ability to buy and sell 
goats.
Aside from Lorugum, where traders suggested that the intervention comprised 25 to 50% 
of their usual trade volumes, most traders across the market centres studied, suggested 
that livestock volumes involved in the off-take intervention were very low and, therefore, 
comprised a very small percentage of their usual trade. It must be noted, however, that, 
whilst the volume of trade associated with the off-take intervention was low, it had the 
propensity to tie up a much larger proportion of working capital. Indeed, while admitting that 
the numbers of goats involved in the off-take intervention comprised only a small percentage 
of their trading activities, Lokichar LMA members stated that it ‘tied up 25% of their working 
capital’.
Number of adakars and households reached
In an attempt to verify the TELO Report’s claim that the most vulnerable pastoralists and 
livestock owners benefi ted, traders were probed as to where, when and from whom they 
bought goats during the off-take. Results from the FGDs that were held in fi ve market centres 
yielded disappointing results. In Kerio market, traders informed the FGD that they had been 
instructed to buy one or two weak goats from each adakar. However, during the off-take 
period, traders bought their goats on a fi rst-come, fi rst-served basis over a period of just two 
weeks. Many adakar members brought goats to the market but traders were unable to buy 
them all. In Lokichar, adakars were informed of the destocking activity through a barasa, 
but, as in Kerio, goats were purchased on a fi rst-come, fi rst-served basis. In Kalemnarok, 
LMA members openly admitted that they had bought goats from adakars close to the market 
centre and pastoralists who lived further away brought their goats when it was too late. In the 
Kaleng area, the situation was even worse. In total there are 100 adakars in the area but only 
2 adakars benefi ted from the destocking activity. Pastoralists from the local FGD suggested 
that both adakars involved in the destocking sold approximately 30 goats, which were 
divided among the households, some sold 2, 3 or 4 goats. Whilst TELO fi eld data supports 
the statement that only 60 goats were purchased from the area, it states that a total of 5 local 
adakars, and not 2, were involved in the destocking intervention. Pastoralists from the Kaleng 
FGD suggested that pastoralists from more peripheral adakars came and complained. They 
criticized the LOCC and wanted to sell goats, but they had to be turned down because the 
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60 goats allocated for off-take had already been purchased. When probed about why the two 
adakars were singled out, the adakar members replied ‘because they have water as they’re 
close to the well’, and the main arterial road.
3.2.2.4 Problems with destocking
Whilst most LMA members across the different market centres studied suggested that the 
destocking intervention was a good idea, many traders harboured a raft of reservations and 
complaints. These ranged from low profi t margins, high bank charges, and long delays in 
receiving cash payments, liability concerns associated with goat mortalities and feeding 
costs, and unscrupulous LMA offi cials.
Low profi t margins
Most traders across the fi ve market centres suggested, either explicitly or implicitly, that profi t 
margins associated with the destocking intervention were too low. Indeed, some traders in 
the Lokichar FGD insisted that they had even lost money during the intervention (see below). 
In order to make the destocking activity worthwhile, traders from Lodwar went as far as 
insisting on a profi t of KES 300 to KES 400 per goat.
High bank charges
In many respects, high bank charges, and the costs associated with getting to Lodwar to 
cash their cheques, were the principal complaints of livestock traders associated with the 
destocking activity of 2005, and, indeed, the major factor in determining traders’ profi t 
margins. In Kerio, traders complained that the bank, at which they cashed their cheques, 
charged a commission of KES 300 for a cheque worth less than KES15 thousand, and KES 
200 commission for cheques valued at more than KES 15 thousand. Traders from Lokichar 
and Lorugum echoed these concerns stating that ‘every trader involved in the destocking 
activity was charged KES 300 to cash his/her cheque’. Lokichar and Lorugum traders also 
complained about the high costs associated with travelling to Lodwar to cash their cheques. 
Lorugum traders complained that each trader was expected to travel to Lodwar in order to 
cash cheque. They suggested that, in addition to the cost of transport to and from Lodwar 
at KES 400 per person, board and lodgings costs also amounted to KES 400/day. All in all, 
LMA members from Lorugum implied that they failed to clear a profi t during the destocking 
activity. In Kalemnarok, LMA members explained that the bank charged them KES 30 per KES 
1000 cheque, and that transport to and from Lodwar cost an additional KES 400. Even the 
LMA in Lodwar complained about high bank charges associated with cashing their cheques; 
however, they suggested that the bank took a fl at rate of KES 100 per cheque. 
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Delays in receiving cash payments
Three of the fi ve FGD groups of market traders complained about long delays between 
buying their goats for the destocking intervention and cashing their cheques in Lodwar. In 
Kerio, traders complained about having to wait 20 days before they could cash their cheques. 
This sentiment was reiterated by the market monitor in Kerio. He suggested that it was the 
usual practice for traders to make a return of KES 20–40 per day on every KES 200 invested. 
He stressed that many traders temporarily lost KES 3000–4000 of their working capital for 
up to 1 month, and, ultimately, it was the sellers that gained rather than the traders. LMA 
members in Lokichar went further by implying that each trader involved in the destocking 
intervention had lost KES 1200 because their money was tied up for such a long time. Traders 
from Lorugum also complained of capital been tied up for a long time, suggesting that the 
opportunity cost of their tied capital was equivalent to the profi t made on one goat.
Feeding costs and goat mortalities
Hidden costs associated with feeding goats and goat mortalities were mentioned by LMA 
traders from Lokichar and Kalemnarok. Traders from Lokichar were unhappy about having 
to absorb the costs of keeping/feeding the goats they had bought as part of the destocking 
intervention. In some cases, they had to bear the costs of keeping/feeding the goats for up to 
two weeks. In addition, Lokichar LMA members stressed that some goats were so weak that 
they died while in their hands and that they (the traders) were expected to absorb the losses. 
These sentiments were also echoed by LMA members from Kalemnarok, stating that ‘some 
goats died while they took care of them for 1 week—before taking them to their respective 
schools’. In concert with Lokichar, LMA members were not compensated for their dead goats. 
3.2.2.5 Willingness to be part of a destocking activity in the future
Whilst all the LMAs interviewed suggested that they would be willing to be part of future 
destocking interventions, most of the traders interviewed had a range of suggestions as to 
how the destocking process could be improved. All LMAs insisted that institutions planning 
future destocking interventions should increase the amount of commission per goat. Kerio 
traders insisted that pastoralists should receive KES 1000 and traders should receive KES 
1500. Interestingly, traders from Kalemnarok initially suggested that goat prices should 
be between KES 1000–1200 in order to make it worthwhile for them to take part in a 
future destocking intervention. However, when the group continued discussing the topic, 
they raised hidden costs such as paying a herdsman and the costs incurred through goat 
mortalities and they concluded that the price per goat in future destocking interventions 
should be KES 1500. LMA members from Lorugum were even more ambitious, demanding 
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that the price paid per goat in a future destocking intervention should be KES 2000 per 
goat. After further probing, traders from Lorugum admitted that they would accept KES 
1500 if each trader was allocated larger volumes of goats. They also stipulated that a future 
destocking process would function more effectively if traders were allowed to negotiate the 
price they pay per goat directly with the pastoralists without having a price imposed by the 
destocking institution.
Traders from Kerio, Lokichar and Kalemnarok suggested that they would be interested in 
being involved in future destocking activities if the intervention took place over a longer 
period of time and if more animals were involved. LMA members from Lokichar suggested 
that the destocking period should parallel the length of the drought (6 months or so). Traders 
from Kerio also were keen to stress that future destocking intervention institutions should 
ensure that there were no delays in receiving their payments for goats purchased, and it 
should be cash and not cheque. In concert with LMA members from Lokichar, LMA members 
from Kerio also insisted that any future destocking activity should involve more traders. Kerio 
traders insisted that tenders for destocking should come directly to the traders and not be 
infl uenced by key individuals in the area. Interestingly, traders from Kalemnarok suggested 
that in a future destocking intervention, traders should be allowed to purchase healthy 
goats. They appeared to be under the misapprehension that only unhealthy goats were to 
be purchased as part of the 2004/2005 destocking intervention. The purchase, and delivery, 
of unhealthy goats was confi rmed through an interview with the local school (see below), 
where many goats were declared ill and the intestines had to be discarded. 
3.2.3 Role of head masters and health centre managers
During the enrolment process, VSF-Belgium selected boarding schools from a list provided to 
them by the DEO. Likewise, health centres were selected on the basis of having in-patients. 
From the evidence reviewed, it is apparent that, many of the key school and health centre 
actors were simply assigned roles within the project rather than successfully enrolled. It 
appears that schools and health centres were assigned a set number of goats to be delivered 
on a pre-arranged date, where they would be slaughtered and consumed. Their principal 
incentive to play the part assigned to them by the DSG and VSF-Belgium was their assumed 
willingness to accept and consume free goats and to use the savings, associated with not 
having to purchase their usual quantities of goat meat, on supporting the most vulnerable 
pupils/in-patients in their schools/health centres.
According to the TELO Report (2005), boarding schools and health centres were the principal 
recipients of free goats as part of the 2005 destocking intervention. The TELO Report states 
that 35,197 very poor and poor students in 84 secondary and primary schools were targeted 
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to receive fresh meat. The Report goes on to state that over 327 in-patients in the six health 
facilities also benefi ted from an increase of protein in their diet. Indeed, the Report suggests 
that some patients who had left the hospital before concluding treatment in Kakuma Mission 
Hospital returned after they learnt of the meat distribution.
As part of the fi eld-level research conducted by the evaluation team, one health centre (Katilu 
Health Centre) and four schools (Nadapal Mixed Primary School, Turkana Integrated School-
Katilu, Lorugum Primary (boarding) School, and Kaputir Primary (boarding and day) School—
Near Kalemnarok) were visited to validate claims made by the TELO Report. 
3.2.3.1 Number, and timing, of goats received and their physical condition
All the benefi ting institutions visited confi rmed that they had received goats as part of the 
2005 destocking intervention. Katilu Health Centre confi rmed that 14 young and tender goats 
were received thrice weekly over a period of two weeks. Whilst TELO fi eld data broadly 
corroborates the number of goats received by the health centre (18), it does not corroborate 
the claim that the goats were received thrice weekly. Indeed, only two deliveries of 9 goats, 
one on the 31st of January and another on the 17th of February were recorded. In addition, 
there is only slaughter records for 4 of the 18 goats received. 
Nadapal Mixed Primary School informed the evaluation team that they received 
approximately 97 to 98 goats in medium condition in either two or three instalments. TELO 
fi eld data broadly corroborates the number of goats received by the school (93) as well as the 
number of deliveries (2); the fi rst batch on the 31st of January and the second batch on the 
17th of February. However, there are slaughter records for only 47 of the 93 goats received. 
Staff from the school informed the evaluation team that seven (8 kg) goats were slaughtered 
three days a week (Monday, Wednesday, Friday). 
Lorugum Primary Boarding School’s head teacher informed the evaluation team that they had 
received 64 big goats in good condition; 28 goats were received in one delivery in February, 
followed by 7 goats, fi ve days per week, over the subsequent two weeks. Unfortunately, this 
data is not corroborated in the TELO fi eld data, which suggests that a total of 88 goats were 
delivered in two consignments on the 1st of February (46) and the 17th of February (42). 
Furthermore, there is only slaughter records for 42 of the 88 goats delivered. According to the 
head teacher at the school, the goats were slaughtered the same day that they were delivered. 
Given the lack of refrigerated storage available in the area, the logistics of slaughtering and 
preserving more than 40 goats at a time, render the head teacher’s comments unbelievable. 
The head teacher also suggested that 2 out of the 7 goats received every day were donated by 
the Lorugum Health Centre. The TELO Report stated that 450 pupils received supplementary 
goat meat but did not state how many goats were delivered. 
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Unfortunately, Turkana Integrated School-Katilu received approximately 80 unhealthy 
goats in two instalments instead of the regular supply of goats, over a period of one month, 
originally agreed upon. The head master informed the evaluation team that, after much 
persuasion, LMA members eventually exchanged the weakest and unhealthiest animals for 
goats in better condition. However, according to TELO fi eld data, a total of 93 goats were 
delivered in one instalment on the 31st of January. There were no slaughter records for any 
of the goats received by the school. Whilst this may have been related to the problems of 
ill health alluded to above, it also raises concerns regarding the potential for fraudulent 
behaviour. 
A similar situation arose in Kaputir Primary (boarding and day) School, near Kalemnarok, 
which received 91 goats (the same number as TELO Report) but approximately 75% of them 
were very weak. After inspection by the Public Health Department, it transpired that most of 
the goats’ intestines were bad and had to be discarded. The goats were delivered at a rate of 
25 per week, for 3 weeks, and the rest in the 4th week. These were slaughtered at a rate of 
fi ve per day, fi ve days per week. School staff suggested that, starting with the weakest, they 
slaughtered the goats as soon as possible because they didn’t have much land on which the 
goats could browse. Unfortunately, the TELO fi eld data does not corroborate this information. 
Field data suggests that goats were delivered to the school in two instalments, the fi rst on the 
31st of January (45 goats) and the second on the 17th of February (46 goats). Again, as with 
Turkana Integrated School, there were no slaughter records for the school. In a surprising 
twist, two adakar pastoralists came to the school and took their goats away, saying the goats 
were sold/bought during their absence by other members from their adakar. Interestingly, 
the TELO Report stated that 45 goats were delivered by one trader. Lastly, it transpires that, 
although the guidelines laid down by VSF-Belgium stressed that local traders should only 
purchase weak animals fi t for human consumption, several traders purchased goats, either 
knowingly or unknowingly, that were not suitable for human consumption.
3.2.3.2 Costs incurred for keeping or processing goats
Determination of hidden costs associated with the keeping, or processing, of goats was 
a key concern of the evaluation team. Transcripts from key informant interviews with the 
individuals from schools and health centres confi rmed that several recipients of free goat 
meat incurred a range of additional costs. The principal costs involved in the receipt of free 
goats were associated with the need for the recipient institution to hire someone to look after 
the goats until they were slaughtered and consumed. Katilu Health Centre hired a shepherd 
to look after their goats at a rate of KES 50/day. There was no mention of slaughter fees but 
the head nurse did mention that a Community Animal Health Worker (CAHW) inspected the 
meat and that all the goats were able to be eaten. Similarly, Kaputir Primary School hired 
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someone to slaughter the goats who also served as a herdsman for the two and a half months 
that they looked after the goats. The individual concerned was paid at the rate of 1 goat per 
month. Whilst school workers and cooks volunteered to look after the goats received by 
Turkana Integrated School until their slaughter, some of the food (maize and acacia pods), 
which the goats consumed, needed to be purchased. Volunteers also looked after the goats 
delivered to Nadapal Mixed Primary School until they were slaughtered. There was no 
mention of slaughter fees.
3.2.3.3 Number of pupils or in-patients fed
According to the key informant from Katilu Health Centre, approximately 3 to 5 in-patients 
were fed with goat meat as a direct result of the destocking intervention. This is signifi cantly 
less than the 13 patients stated in the TELO Report. Nadapal Mixed Primary School stated 
that approximately 410 children were fed with the free goat meat, 50 pupils less than the 460 
stated by the TELO Report. Staff at Turkana Integrated School suggested that approximately 
250 were fed with the free goat meat. In Lorugum Primary School, staff suggested that 510 
children benefi ted from free goat meat, and in Kaputir Primary School, approximately 385 
children were reported as benefi ting.
3.2.3.4 Role of goat meat in supplementing in-patient’s diet
One of the key claims of the TELO Report was that school children would benefi t from an 
increase in the animal protein content in their diets, which predominantly consist of cereals 
provided by the School Feeding Program. The evaluation team set out to establish both the 
average diet of school children and health centre in-patients and whether or not this had 
indeed been supplemented by the provision of free goat meat. 
All institutions visited that benefi ted from free goat meat stated that the destocking 
intervention had increased the amount of animal protein in the diet of their pupils/in-patients. 
The head nurse from Katilu Health Centre informed the evaluation team that the standard 
daily diet for in-patients consisted of 2.5 kg of meat per day (spread between the numbers of 
in-patients) in conjunction with ugali, beans and maize. She stated that, as a result of the free 
goat meat, the nutritional status of patients had improved; in-patients received bigger chunks 
of meat in their daily rations. However, she could not quantify exactly how much extra they 
received.
In Nadapal Mixed Primary School, children were used to eating two goats per week, 
supplemented by beans. The head teacher informed the evaluation team that, as a result of 
the free goat meat, there was a signifi cant increase in the children’s consumption of animal 
protein at least throughout the duration of the destocking intervention.
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With regard to Lorugum Primary School, the head teacher informed the evaluation team that 
pupils usually received meat in their diet twice weekly. During the destocking intervention, 
the provision of free goats resulted in each pupil receiving two extra meat meals a week—an 
additional 30–35 kg spread between 510 pupils (i.e. 64 grams/child). 
In Kaputir Primary School, which is both a boarding and day school, the head teacher 
informed the evaluation team that the standard lunch time meal for pupils consisted 
of yellow peas (from WFP), maize and salt. On the other hand, the evening meal (only 
consumed by boarding pupils) was comprised of ugali, green vegetables and meat (at least 
on Mondays, Wednesdays and Saturdays). The evaluation team was informed that the school 
buys 500 grams of meat/child per month (depending on the number of boarders) and that 
each child received at least 42 grams of meat per meal. The head teacher suggested that, as 
a direct result of the destocking program, meat was included in the evening menu 5 days a 
week. In addition, meat continued to be consumed on Saturdays, as it was a tradition of the 
school. The head teacher informed the evaluation team that, in his view, the provision of free 
goat meat had improved the health of his boarding pupils, at least for the 4 week duration of 
the destocking intervention. Unfortunately, however, day students did not benefi t from the 
provision of free goats.
Lastly, the head teacher at Turkana Integrated School-Katilu informed the evaluation team 
that his pupils’ usual diet consisted of green gram, maize and peas. During the destocking 
exercise, the diet changed to ugali (maize fl our) and goat meat. In the words of the head 
teacher ‘the little bit of meat that the children usually received came from their parents’. 
He stressed that the provision of ‘free goat meat substantially increased the children’s 
consumption of animal protein’. However, the head teacher was keen to point out that, as 
Turkana Integrated School was a day school, they should not have been eligible to receive 
free goat. He stressed that this situation was a signifi cant oversight as boarding students in 
other schools usually received meat as part of their weekly diet, whereas day school students 
did not. He also exclaimed that it was rare for day students to receive meat at home as part of 
their evening meal.
3.2.3.5 Savings made as a result of free goat meat
Aside from the potential for free goat meat to supplement the diets of pupils and in-patients, 
the evaluation team also wanted to determine whether or not the institutions receiving free 
goats had been able to make cash savings. According to the TELO Report, schools were 
expected to use the savings as food for fees and uniforms for the needy pupils. Key informant 
interviews with the respective head teachers and nurse generated interesting insights into 
how the destocking activity had worked on the ground. All institutions receiving free goats 
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admitted that they had saved money through not having to purchase their usual quantities 
of goat meat. With regard to Turkana Integrated School, this was a bit of an anomaly as they 
had previously stated that the children generally did not consume meat as part of their usual 
school diet. In the case of Katilu Health Centre, the head nurse stressed that ‘the destocking 
activity was timely because the Health Centre’s usual supplier of goat meat was having 
diffi culties and that goat meat supplies had been curtailed’. Indeed, the head nurse went on 
to say that the free goat meat ‘saved the institution’. Cash savings were used to pay the Health 
Centre’s night guard. Nadapal Mixed Primary School was also able to make savings by not 
having to purchase their usual two goats per week. Savings were used to purchase paraffi n. In 
the case of Turkana Integrated School, savings were also made by not having to purchase the 
usual one goat per week. These savings were used to purchase salt and essential items for the 
children such as paraffi n for lamps so that children could study in the evenings. In Lorugum 
Primary School, the local butcher, who normally supplied the weekly 28 kg of goat meat 
to the school, was part of the group of traders who supplied the school with high quantities 
(30–35 kg) of free goat meat. However, the interviewee could not remember exactly what 
the savings were used for. Lastly, the head teacher from Kaputir Primary School informed 
the evaluation team that the money saved was used to buy uniforms and bags for the special 
needs children and some new window ‘doors’. The school council decided how the money 
was spent.
3.2.3.6 Fate of goat skins
According to the TELO Report (2005), the LOCC collected and sold all the goat skins and 
used the proceeds to ‘fund community activities’. In an attempt to trace the benefi ts of the 
destocking intervention, key informants were asked about the fate of their goat skins. In the 
case of Katilu Health Centre, the head nurse informed the evaluation team that the goat skins 
had been sold at KES 20 each and that the proceeds had been used to pay the shepherd who 
watched over the goats until they were slaughtered. The head teacher from Nadapal Mixed 
Primary School also stated that their goat skins had also been sold and the proceeds used to 
buy salt. He was unsure about the price paid for goat skins. The head teacher from Turkana 
Integrated School informed the evaluation team that their goat skins had been sold at KES 30 
each and that the proceeds had been used to buy essential items for the school. No details 
were provided as to what the essential items were. In the case of Lorugum Primary School, 
the head teacher informed the evaluation team that their goat skins had been sold and 
proceeds had been used to buy the examination papers. Lastly, the head teacher from Kaputir 
Primary School informed the evaluation team that their goat skins had been dried and sold to 
the local community. The proceeds from the skin sales had been used to buy essential items 
for the school kitchen.
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3.2.3.7 Fate of goat offal
According to the TELO Report (2005), offal was supposedly ‘given as labour charge to 
the people who slaughter the goats after delivering the meat to the respective schools/ 
institutions’. In reality, this was diffi cult to confi rm in most cases. In the case of Katilu Health 
Centre, it was the shepherd who received hooves, heads and offal from the goats. It was 
diffi cult to ascertain whether or not the shepherd also acted as the slaughterer. In the case of 
Nadapal Mixed Primary School, it was the goat skinners who received the goat offal. Again, 
it was diffi cult to ascertain whether or not the skinners were also the slaughterers. The other 
benefi ting institutions were prompted as to the fate of offal but the head teachers could not 
remember exactly what they had done with them.
3.2.3.8 Impact on School and Health Centre attendance
According to the TELO Report (2005), all schools had benefi ted from increased pupil 
enrolment. Indeed, the Report went on to say that ‘there was a marked increase in enrolment 
in all schools visited which was attributed to availability of additional pastoralist friendly 
food—goat meat. Their previous meals, mainly cereals, were not as appealing to the 
children as the meat enriched diet. Unfortunately, on the ground, this was a little diffi cult 
to substantiate. For example, according to the head teacher at Lorugum Primary School, 
enrolment fi gures increased as children from local day schools enrolled because of the free 
goat meat on offer. Kaputir Primary School was a similar case. The head teacher suggested 
that more children had attended his school during the destocking activity, including some 
children from other day schools. However, by the end of the destocking intervention, 
enrolment fi gures had not changed because the pupils returned to their respective schools. 
In the case of Nadapal Mixed Primary School, whilst refraining from claiming that enrolment 
had improved during the destocking period, the head teacher did suggest that, if the 
destocking intervention had been conducted over a much longer period (a school term), he 
would have expected enrolment to have increased substantially.
However, aside from Katilu Health Centre, all schools visited during the evaluation suggested 
that school attendance was very high during the destocking period. Indeed, the head 
teacher from Turkana Integrated School went further by claiming that attendance during the 
destocking month was almost 100%, and that this was as a direct result of offering a goat 
meat rich diet.
3.2.3.9 Suggestions for improvements in destocking activities
In line with the questions posed to the adakar pastoralist and livestock traders FGDs, the 
recipients of free goat meat were also asked whether or not future destocking activities could 
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be improved. While the head nurse in Katilu Health Centre was keen to point out that the 
‘extra meat supply to the Health Centre was very good’, she suggested future destocking 
interventions would be even more benefi cial for the health centre if the activity was spread 
over a longer time frame. This sentiment was echoed by Nadapal Mixed Primary School, 
Turkana Integrated School, and Kaputir Primary School. The head teacher from Kaputir 
Primary School went further by adding that he would have preferred fewer goats per week 
but over a longer period. The head teacher from Kaputir Primary School also suggested that 
institutions responsible for future destocking interventions should ensure that the people who 
are given the tenders to buy goats should only supply healthy animals. 
Head teachers from both Nadapal Mixed Primary School and Turkana Integrated School also 
suggested that, in the future, it would be more benefi cial if goats could be held in a central 
holding area until the school was ready to slaughter and eat them (probably twice or thrice 
weekly). The head teacher from Turkana Integrated School also insisted that it was important 
to include day schools as key benefi ciaries, insisting that the children in these schools do 
not generally eat meat, and that destocking could be a way to ensure that non-boarding 
children have at least a little animal protein in their diet. The head teacher from Turkana 
Integrated School suggested that future destocking activities could be improved if they could 
be strategically timed to overtly encourage pupil enrolment. He also suggested that there 
should be a greater involvement of the local community in future destocking activities, that 
goat meat could be used in food for work programs, and that payment for the goats should be 
in cash and paid in the local area.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Identifi cation of external drivers, ensuing problems 
and potential solutions
In many ways, the destocking intervention in January and February 2005 can be seen as a 
success story. However, as with most complex processes, it is diffi cult for executing agencies 
to envisage all eventualities. From the off-set, all key actors agreed that drought was the 
principal external driver and that drought was the major contributor to growing problems of 
water and pasture/browse scarcity. Likewise, key actors agreed that lack of water and pasture/
browse was the principal reason for the concomitant deterioration in livestock condition. 
There is also substantial evidence to support the supposition that there was a growing 
consensus, between all major actors in pastoralist systems, of the key external driver, key 
drought-related problems, and the concomitant impact on pastoralists’ livelihoods. However, 
it was unclear from the evidence reviewed, what part, if any, pastoralists played in setting the 
parameters for the LSP assessment. In addition, it was diffi cult to assess the inclusivity and 
transparency of the LSP assessment process. 
If pastoralists were involved, was this simply confi ned to chiefs and other key members of the 
pastoral communities? What kind of information fl ows ensued? Did chiefs hold community 
meetings in each adakar to gather information?
4.2 Internal drivers and key actors and actants
Based on the literature reviewed, and empirical research undertaken as part of this 
evaluation, it is evident that the DSG, LSP, and its component development actors, provided 
the internal momentum required to devise and implement this drought ameliorating 
intervention. The DSG and LSP were active in assimilating signifi cant written and verbal 
evidence of the impending problems and were able to muster the political will to act and 
to secure crucial fi nancial support. From the information utilized in compiling this report, 
it is evident that the DSG, LSP, and their concomitant members, functioned effi ciently and 
effectively in the process of identifying key external drivers, major problems and key actors 
and actants. 
4.3 Enrolment of actors and actants
However, the process of enrolling actors and actants in a coherent response to the lack of 
water and pasture met with mixed results. From the literature reviewed, and the detailed 
empirical research undertaken in the fi eld, it was diffi cult to fi nd any evidence of pastoralists, 
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community leaders, livestock traders, and the eventual recipients of free meat being part 
of the process of deliberating and defi ning a solution to the problems identifi ed. Indeed, it 
was DSG and LSP members who selected destocking as the most appropriate intervention 
and who devised and managed the implementation mechanism. While it is true to say that 
substantial evidence exists to support the supposition that members of the DSG and LSP 
have a very good understanding of conditions on the ground, there is no substitute for the 
central involvement of ultimate benefi ciaries in the process of identifying both problems 
and solutions. From an actor network perspective, the key actors involved in planning the 
destocking intervention were mostly international NGOs, and regional and district level 
institutions. Other groups and individuals involved in the destocking activity were passive 
actors and actants that were simply assigned their roles by the DSG, LSP and VSF-Belgium.
The following sections discuss whether or not key actors, namely, pastoralists, LMAs and 
livestock traders, recipients of free goat meat, and key actants (water, browse and goats) were 
successfully enrolled in the destocking process and whether or not they executed their roles 
in the manner intended by VSF-Belgium.
4.4 Role of pastoralists
From the literature reviewed and detailed fi eld work undertaken as part of this evaluation, 
concerns were raised that pastoralists were assigned a rather passive role in the destocking 
intervention. In addition, because of apparent irregularities associated with information 
fl ows, many pastoralists were not even properly enrolled in the process as passive actors. 
While it appears that many of the pastoralists enrolled in the destocking intervention were 
aware of their own roles, and the roles of the livestock traders and goat meat benefi ciaries, 
there is also evidence that many were not clear about either their own roles or the roles of 
other key actors.
4.4.1 Sensitization to destocking intervention
It is clear that, while many pastoralists were indeed reached through the dialogue meetings 
held in the 29 buying centres, many pastoralists, possibly those furthest away from market 
centres, were not reached. While it is true that, of the eleven adakars represented in the 
FGDs, a total of nine adakars had sold, or believed that they had sold, goats as part of the 
destocking intervention, only representatives from fi ve adakars (Kerio and Kaleng) had 
been sensitized to the forthcoming destocking intervention through a community barasa. 
In Kalemnarok, the four adakars represented were totally unaware of a community barasa 
sensitizing them to the off-take activity. Indeed, they suggested that the reason they had 
supplied goats for off-take was because they had been informed of the off-take activity by 
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local traders in search of weak goats. In Kanukurdio adakar (Kaleng) only 2 adakars out of 
a 100 local adakars took part in, and were sensitized to, the destocking intervention. The 
fi ve adakars that did take part were adjacent to bore holes. In Lokichar, the pastoralists 
interviewed had not been sensitized to the destocking activity. Instead, they only heard about 
the destocking activity when weak animals were being consumed by local school children. 
Later in the interview, they did admit that they may have inadvertently sold goats to traders 
buying weak goats at the time. Lastly, pastoralists from the Lougogo adakar (Lorugum) were 
totally unaware of destocking activity.
4.4.2 Targeting of the most vulnerable pastoralists
Overall, it is likely that many of the most vulnerable pastoralists may have been excluded 
from the benefi ts of the destocking intervention, either because of their geography or 
their lack of local social and political capital (social connections). Whilst there is general 
agreement that most households will only sell livestock, especially small stock such as goats 
and sheep, when faced with immediate cash/food security needs, it is likely that a structural 
bias existed predisposing the intervention to purchase more goats from pastoralists with larger 
herds, rather the most vulnerable pastoralists in the intervention area. This premise is based 
on two assumptions. First, those pastoralists with larger herds are generally more market-
oriented, than those owning fewer livestock, and are more predisposed to take advantage 
of the off-take intervention. Many households, owning less than 10 Tropical Livestock Units 
(TLUs) do not usually sell animals (Barrett et al. 2004). The poorest and most vulnerable 
households are often those with smaller livestock holdings and less extensive social support 
networks (Swift et al. 2002). Second, if the protocol of limiting goat purchases to one per 
household was not upheld, pastoralists owning large goat herds are likely, in absolute terms, 
to sell a greater number of goats.
The evaluation team also was concerned that the majority of benefi ciaries of the destocking 
intervention were probably located close to major livestock market centres and/or benefi ting 
schools and hospitals or were selected due to their proximity to boreholes etc., where goats 
could be watered before being trekked to their respective schools and hospitals. Even in the 
adakars that were represented in the community barasas, where sensitization took place, it 
appears as though information fl ows may have been restricted, and that many of the poorest 
and most vulnerable individuals may have been excluded from key information with regard 
to the destocking activity. Whilst acknowledging that most of the pastoralists in the areas 
selected for intervention were indeed vulnerable, it is diffi cult to support claims from VSF-
Belgium that the intervention involved the most vulnerable pastoralists due to the apparent 
spatial bias in the selection of benefi ting adakars. 
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4.4.3 Pastoralists’ participation in the intervention
For those pastoralists who did take part in the destocking intervention, knowingly or 
otherwise, did they execute their roles as expected? With regard to the number of goats 
sold during the off-take period, pastoralists, representing the nine adakars that sold goats, 
suggested that the number of goats sold as part of destocking varied between one and 
ten. However, the TELO monitoring data suggested that the average number of goats sold 
per household/goat owner was between 1.5 and 3 depending on the area. Although the 
guidelines of the intervention stipulated that traders should only buy 1 goat from each 
individual household, the evaluation team would argue that the resulting averages are not a 
bad accomplishment, as they still cater for a reasonable spread. Although the intervention 
seemed to achieve a reasonable spread of the benefi ts, the scale of the project did not reach 
many vulnerable households. Indeed, many pastoralists complained that goats were bought 
on a fi rst-come, fi rst-served basis. This meant that those adakars closest to main arterial roads 
and markets, and those lucky enough to have been sensitized to the off-take, were those 
that benefi ted most from the destocking activity. Indeed, many pastoralists from peripheral 
adakars complained, particularly when they had trekked goats to market, only to fi nd that the 
local destocking quota had been met. 
One of the most important objectives of a destocking project is usually to save livestock 
assets, as it is anticipated that the income from animal sales may be used to restock after the 
drought. But since buying one female (breeding) goat is usually more expensive than the 
price received for 1 (weak male) goat, the rule of destocking 1 goat per household might have 
to be reviewed. One could argue that the individual households’ share of the intervention 
(i.e. the number of weak goats they are allowed to sell) should be proportionate to the size 
of their herds. But this would not take into account the compassionate feeling that those that 
have few animals have more to lose. When instead one chooses to allocate an equal number 
of goat sales to as many households as possible, this is motivated by a rather relief-oriented 
imperative. But others could argue that when relief to (selected) vulnerable households is 
included as an objective, then the individual households’ share of the intervention should be 
based on the family sizes, which relates to the food need and translates into the number of 
goats sales needed to raise enough money to purchase that food.
4.4.4 Variability of prices paid for goats
With regard to the price received for weak healthy goats, pastoralists interviewed suggested 
that, while they were aware of the price that they were supposed to have received, many 
sold their animals at a much lower price because traders were not willing to pay the agreed 
KES 800. Some pastoralists claimed that traders had purchased goats for as little as KES 300. 
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Signifi cantly, pastoralists in Kerio suspended goat sales at the end of the second week of the 
off-take activity in protest to the low prices paid for their goats by local traders. Although 
TELO fi eld records on prices paid corroborates the occurrence of underpayments, these cases 
mostly occurred in Southern Turkana. Conversely, traders also accused pastoralists of abusing 
the system by exhorting up to KES 850–900 per goat, as they were aware of the amount of 
commission made by the traders when they sold their goats. It must be noted that this claim 
was not widely supported amongst the traders interviewed. However, TELO data presented 
in this Report suggest that, while there were hardly any cases of overpayment in the Central 
Zone, 18% of goat transactions in the Northwest Zone involved over-payment.
Lastly, with regard to the quality of goats supplied, some pastoralists, that were either 
unaware of the stipulation for weak but healthy goats, were unaware of the condition of their 
goats, or were intent to abuse the system, supplied goats that were so weak that they died 
before reaching the schools/health centres or goats that were diseased and unfi t for human 
consumption. From an actor network perspective, if the pastoralists were unaware of the 
condition (health) of their goats, it was the goats (actants) that did not execute the passive 
role assigned them by VSF-Belgium. Ultimately, their principal roles were to trek from the 
adakar to the market and then the school/health centre and be fi t for human consumption. 
4.4.5 Pastoralists’ impression of the destocking intervention
Pastoralists were asked whether or not they thought that the destocking intervention was a 
good idea and, if they saw the need, how a future destocking activity could be improved. Not 
surprisingly, the most frequent response related to the price offered per goat. Across the areas 
visited, most respondents suggested that, in order to encourage pastoralists to destock at the 
onset of drought, institutions undertaking goat off-take needed to offer between KES 900 and 
KES 1000 per goat even though many pastoralists admitted that in times of need they often 
sold goats at KES 600. Other suggestions for improvements put forward by a minority of 
respondents included the need for a one-off destocking event, rather than destocking over a 
period of three to four weeks; a suggestion that it would be more equitable for the pastoralists 
to sell directly to the destocking agency, rather through livestock traders; more goats should 
be destocked, up to 75% and; cattle and camels should also be considered in a future 
destocking activity.
4.5 Role of LMAs, livestock traders and local markets
From the literature reviewed and detailed fi eld work undertaken as part of this evaluation, 
three principal concerns were raised. First, traders were assigned a rather passive role in the 
destocking intervention. Second, key LMA actors were in a position to capture the lion’s 
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share of benefi ts ensuing from the destocking activity. One of the key recommendations 
for future destocking activities, emerging from traders, was the need for the involvement 
of more traders and less undue infl uence by powerful individuals in the area. Third, due to 
their signifi cant room to manoeuvre, the role of traders in the destocking intervention was 
open to abuse. As a result of the incomplete nature of the pastoralist sensitization process 
and consequent knowledge gaps, in concert with the signifi cant price differential between 
the destocking price and the background price for weak goats, traders were in a position to 
exploit the pastoralists. In addition, the fact that the new arrangements for the purchase of 
weak goats were contradictory to those introduced by VSF-Belgium in its activities aimed at 
promoting market-orientation of pastoralists in Turkana, namely, VSF-Belgium’s attempt to 
create markets in which buyers and sellers come together and negotiate the price, are also 
likely to have enhanced the traders’ room to manoeuvre. According to ANT, the processes 
of negotiation, representation and displacement which establish relations between actors, 
entities and places (termed translation) involves the re-defi nition of previous relationships 
between actors so that traders are persuaded to behave in accordance with new network 
requirements, which were inscribed in the destocking proposal and implementation 
guidelines and that attempt to align heterogeneous elements and consolidate the destocking 
network. However, ANT suggests that networks are often characterized by links between 
actors and intermediaries that are provisional and divergent, where norms are hard to 
establish and standards are frequently compromised. Ultimately, in the case of the destocking 
intervention, the heterogeneous components of the network, namely the traders and 
pastoralist, re-negotiated with one another, which resulted in the formation of variable and 
revisable coalitions, and ever changing shapes (i.e., a signifi cant range of prices paid for the 
goats bought as part of the destocking intervention).
With regard to the impact of the destocking intervention on local markets, there seems to 
have been little impact on both market prices and volumes. Traders suggested that, as the 
buying and selling of weak goats was not a common occurrence, the destocking activity 
almost paralleled normal market activities, which consisted of buying and selling strong 
healthy goats, and that when weak goats are sold they can fetch as little as KES 200 and are 
only sold when a family is almost destitute. With regard to market volumes, the total amount 
of animals offered for sale increased during the destocking activity. However, there was 
some anecdotal evidence that volumes also increased in the market for healthy goats during 
the period of destocking. Lastly, there was a consensus of opinion across the market traders 
interviewed that the destocking activity had increased market attendance, at least for the 
duration of the intervention and throughout March and April 2005. Traders also suggested 
that pastoralists, not known for offering animals for sale, attended the market for the fi rst time 
during and after the destocking activity. Traders believed that this was a result of the high 
prices being offered for weak goats.
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As far as the impact on livestock trading businesses is concerned, as the volumes of goats 
associated with destocking were small, the average number of goats per trader ranges 
from 10 in Central Zone to 42 Northwest Turkana, most traders carried on with their usual 
business. However, many traders insisted that their role in the destocking process had not 
been a profi table one. Most traders complained about low profi t margins associated with 
high bank charges, long delays in receiving cash, liability concerns associated with goat 
mortalities, feeding costs and exclusion from the full benefi ts of destocking by unscrupulous 
LMA offi cials. The majority of traders agreed that any future destocking activity should offer 
KES 1000 to sellers and KES 1500 to traders—a commission of KES 500. They also stated that 
they would prefer cash instead of cheques, and that there should not be delays in payment. 
Many traders complained that the destocking activity tied up a proportion of their working 
capital for a long period. They also wanted to extend the destocking period and cull more 
animals.
4.6 Goat intervention price and market development
Although pastoralists would desire high prices to motivate them to sell, some pastoralists 
that had not been aware of the intervention reported being pleasantly surprised when 
they received KES 600 for the weak goats they brought to the market. Moreover, from 
the qualitative information gathered, the evaluation team understands that the farm gate 
(or household level) price for goats can be as low as KES 300. In two LMA FGDs, traders 
indicated that the lowest price paid for weak and thin goats was as low as KES 200, but more 
often it was stressed that nobody is interested in buying such weak goats.
A price of KES 800 paid to livestock owners for weak and thin goats may well be four 
times their true ‘market’ value (suggested to be KES 200). Apparently, such a high price 
has left the traders with a lot of bargaining power, and many livestock owners—destitute 
or at least vulnerable by the time this intervention came—were willing to accept a lower 
price. Some stakeholders have argued that an intervention price should be (20–30%) higher 
than the market price in order to motivate the pastoralists to sell. In light of the above, this 
argument does not seem to hold water. From discussions with key players in the destocking 
intervention, it transpired that the price (of KES 800) was set at this relatively high level 
because of the high market prices in December, when the LSP did assessments throughout 
the district. Many traders wanted the price to be KES 900–950 for the livestock producers but 
many stakeholders even felt the reduced price of KES 800 was too high.
We would argue however that offering a higher-than-market price undermines each attempt 
to institutionalize ‘timely sales to the market’ as a coping strategy by pastoralists. To promote 
timely livestock sales to the markets, the market prices need to be more rewarding than the 
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intervention price for weak goats that have suffered the drought for several weeks. Otherwise, 
after gaining the experience in several recurring droughts, goat owners faced with a possible 
drought will speculate by awaiting a possible intervention—rather than timely selling their 
goats to the market. After all, the same institutions that strive to create awareness for an 
imminent drought are the ones that would several months later come with a destocking 
intervention. Consequently, it would undermine VSF-Belgium efforts to develop livestock 
markets and promote the market-orientation of pastoralists in Turkana.
The other argument used for giving a higher price was to motivate pastoralists to come to 
the markets. In the focus group discussions with LMA traders, there were several reports 
that market attendance—by livestock owners wanting to sell—had increased during and 
immediately after the destocking project. The Lodwar traders said it had introduced some 
pastoralists that had never been to their market before, and they were still coming. However, 
it is debatable whether this increased attendance would not have occurred anyway due to 
the distress situation in which most pastoralists found themselves. And we would argue that 
raising market attendance could be achieved by raising awareness of livestock markets and 
the need to timely sell their animals. Awareness campaigns would certainly be more cost-
effective than destocking interventions, when the aim is raising market attendance.
4.7 Role of head teachers and health centre managers
From the literature reviewed and detailed fi eld work undertaken as part of this evaluation, 
it was evident that the recipients of free goat meat (schools and health centres) were also 
assigned, and played out a rather passive role in the destocking intervention. Their role was 
simply to accept an agreed number of free, but edible, goats over a pre-determined period, 
use the goat meat to supplement either pupils’ or in-patients’ animal protein intake, and 
use the savings, arising from not having to purchase goat meat during the duration of the 
destocking activity and money received from selling goat skins, to act as school fees and/or 
buy essential school items for pupils from the most disadvantaged households. 
4.7.1. Accepting free goats
While all of the schools and health centres visited received roughly the same number of 
free goats specifi ed by the TELO Report, TELO fi eld data failed to corroborate the timing of 
deliveries, condition of the goats, and numbers slaughtered. This was particularly the case in 
Turkana Integrated School and Kaputir Primary Boarding School, which comprised 50%, or 
two out of four, of the schools visited as part of the fi eld level evaluation. Indeed, the TELO 
fi eld data suggests that the deliveries of goats to the institutions in Central and Southern 
Zones were rather synchronized events as the vast majority of deliveries were recorded on 31 
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January and 14 February. In Lake Zone and Northwest Turkana, the deliveries seemed much 
more dispersed. The evaluation team suspects that this was merely a difference in record 
keeping, may be caused by a difference of approach between the zone’s off-take monitors in 
how they explained/introduced monitoring forms to the stakeholders.
According to the TELO Report, recipient institutions were expected to receive, slaughter and 
consume their free goats in almost a simultaneous process. However, it was apparent from 
the evaluation team’s research that the schools and health centres incurred unforeseen costs 
associated with herding their goats and supplying animal feed throughout the period between 
accepting delivery of the goats and their ultimate slaughter and consumption. In some cases, 
goats that were scheduled to be slaughtered and consumed on a Friday or Saturday would be 
delivered, along with goats scheduled to be consumed on a Monday and Wednesday, at the 
beginning of the week. This seems to be supported by the TELO fi eld data, as schools kept 
goats an average of 5 days before slaughtering them. This was considered as an important, 
and negative, feature of the destocking by all recipient institutions. Indeed, both the health 
centre and schools visited had used either some, or all, of the value of their goat skins and 
offal in order to pay for the services of a herdsman or to pay for animal feed. Ironically, it was 
the intention of VSF-Belgium that goat skins should have been collected by the LOCCs and 
used in one way or another to benefi t their local communities.
With regard to the impact of free goat meat on animal protein intake, the fi ndings of the 
evaluation team corroborate VSF-Belgium’s claims that the emergency off-take project 
had a positive impact on the animal protein intake of school pupils and health centre in-
patients, at least to a certain extent as for a large part the meat actually substituted normal 
meat deliveries. Moreover, it would be incorrect to suggest that the provision of free goat 
meat supplemented the usual consumption of goat meat, except in the instances where the 
benefi ting school was a day-school, as these schools do not usually have meat in their diet. 
At boarding schools and health centres, the provision of free goat meat tended to replace 
normal supplies of goat meat in the diet of pupils and in-patients. However, there was both 
a positive and negative twist to the process. The positive twist was that the free goat meat not 
only replaced but increased the supply of goat meat. The negative twist was that, in many 
cases, the supply of free goats almost exceeded the capacity of recipient schools to consume 
them. Indeed, in one instance, Lorugum Primary School actually donated 2 out of every 7 
goats supplied through the destocking activity.
Field work undertaken by the evaluation team could not corroborate the TELO Report’s 
claim that school enrolment had benefi ted signifi cantly from the provision of free goat meat. 
Presumably, the duration of the intervention was too short to achieve this. However, many 
head teachers supported the premise that, if a future destocking activity was strategically 
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timed to coincide with a full school term, it would be likely to have a signifi cantly positive 
impact on school enrolment. However, while it was diffi cult to fi nd evidence to support 
claims that the destocking activity had a positive impact on school enrolment, there was a 
signifi cant amount of evidence that the provision of free goat meat had had a positive impact 
on school attendance. 
Lastly, there were three recommendations suggested by a majority of recipients of free goat 
meat (schools and health centres) on how to improve future destocking activities. Firstly, 
pupils’ nutritional status and enrolment fi gures could have been greatly improved if the same, 
or even greater, number of goats had been supplied over a longer period of time. Second, 
it should be ensured that traders supply only healthy goats. Third, future agencies involved 
in the provision of free goats should provide a central area where goats can be held until 
the schools or health centres are ready to accept delivery, slaughter and consume. Other 
suggestions, made by a minority of recipients include the need for a greater involvement of 
local communities and the payment for goats in cash and in the local area.
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5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the implementing agency had mixed results with respect to meeting its 
key outputs/objectives and in contributing, in a meaningful way, to achieving its overall 
goal. With respect to Output/Objective 4.3.1 in the TELO Report, we conclude that the 
intervention did ‘increase household income among pastoralists’. Indeed, evidence 
corroborates that a total of between KES 6,264,000 and KES 6,338,000 was injected into 
the pastoralist economy. In all, an estimated 2,565 goat owners from over 1000 adakars 
benefi ted from the intervention, compared to the 3212 pastoralists indicated by the 
TELO Report (2005). However, whilst this is a signifi cant number of adakars, it is unclear 
whether or not these were the most destitute adakars and whether or not the most destitute 
households and household members were able to benefi t from the intervention. In addition, 
it is diffi cult to determine the exact distribution of benefi ts due to the variation in prices paid 
by livestock traders for the goats purchased as part of the intervention. Indeed, TELO fi eld 
data highlighted problems associated with under payments, especially in South Zone and 
over payments in Northwest Zone. However, it is likely that most of the cash injected through 
the intervention remained in the divisions in which destocking took place. Whilst this report 
acknowledges that, in collaboration with other LSP members, the implementing agency 
targeted the destocking intervention in areas containing pastoralists most vulnerable to the 
devastating impacts of the drought, it does not suggest in an way that the intervention was 
able to disproportionately benefi t the most vulnerable pastoralists. 
With respect to Output/Objective 4.3.2 in the TELO Report, we conclude that the 
intervention did ‘reduce pressure on water and pasture resources’. This conclusion is based 
on the fact that the intervention managed to remove a total of between 6264 and 6338 
goats in the divisions in which destocking took place. However, this Report suggests that the 
positive impact of removing just over 6000 goats from such a large area, less than 1% of the 
district goat herd, is likely to have been negligible.
With respect to Output/Objective 4.3.3 in the TELO Report, we conclude that the 
intervention did ‘increase food security for vulnerable school children’. Again, this 
conclusion is based on the premise that all school children in the intervention area were 
vulnerable and that many schools in the areas affected by the destocking intervention were 
able to increase the supply of animal protein to their pupils. All in all, 6, 338 goats were 
delivered to 105 institutions. However, whilst the intervention was appreciated by staff and 
pupils/in-patients at the schools and health centres, key informants in these institutions 
offered a range of key improvements for future destocking interventions including the 
provision of fewer, healthy, goats over a longer time frame, and delivered and slaughtered 
in a timely manner. If managed strategically, head teachers believed that a future destocking 
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intervention could have a positive impact on both pupil attendance and enrolment. 
Unfortunately, it is likely that many children, most vulnerable to food insecurity, did not 
attend school during the time of the intervention. 
With respect to Output/Objective 4.3.4 in the TELO Report, the conclusion depends on the 
interpretation of the wording: ‘improve utilization of assets, with livestock owners gaining 
benefi t from vulnerable livestock before the condition of the livestock deteriorates beyond 
the point of selling’. The destocked goats had already lost most of their value. Assuming for 
instance they were grade 3 goats worth KES 600 before the drought, their true worth had 
now decreased to KES 200; so two-thirds of their value had been lost, and therefore they 
could not sell these goats on the real market. In conclusion, the intervention certainly did 
not come ‘before’ the deterioration of the livestock condition beyond the point of selling. On 
the other hand, the intervention eventually came and provided restitution to pastoralists at 4 
times the salvage value of their weak goats. In doing so it improved the utilization of the one-
third of the original assets remaining (in each goat). Evidence generated by the evaluation 
team suggests that several livestock owners sold goats that had deteriorated beyond the 
point of selling. However, it must be noted that the market for weak goats, created by the 
intervention, was an artifi cial market that ran parallel to the existing market for grade 1, 2 and 
3 goats.
Furthermore, it is likely that, on a per capita basis, livestock traders will have benefi ted to a 
greater extent than livestock producers. This would certainly be the case if goat purchases 
were spread between only 336 traders (stated in the TELO fi eld data) and not the 523 traders 
stated in the Final TELO Report. On average, livestock traders bought and sold 19 goats 
during the intervention, generating probably more than KES 4000 per trader, due to their 
bargaining power. However, many traders interviewed as part of the evaluation stressed that 
their profi t margins had been eroded due to high bank charges associated with cashing their 
cheques, delays in payments associated with supplying goats to the recipient schools and 
health centres, and losses incurred due to the need to purchase feed for their goats while 
waiting to deliver them to the benefi ting institutions and the death of weak and sick goats 
in their care. It must be noted, however, that as livestock markets are a relatively recent 
phenomenon in Turkana, many livestock traders are also livestock producers and as such may 
have also benefi ted from the sell of their own goats. 
With respect to Output/Objective 4.3.5 in the TELO Report, we conclude that the 
intervention did ‘increase access to funds made available to livestock owners for future 
restocking’. However, it is important to note that, while much of the cash injected into the 
pastoralist economy could have been put aside for future restocking, there was little evidence 
to support the assumption that pastoralists were planning to save remittances from the sale of 
55
their goats for such a purpose. On the contrary, pastoralists in the FGDs have suggested they 
used this income to cover other expenses. Ultimately, without further research, there is no 
way of determining how pastoralists spent the revenue raised through selling goats as part of 
this intervention. 
With respect to Output/Objective 4.3.6 in the TELO Report, we conclude that, according 
to our key informant interviews with head masters and health centre managers, the ‘money 
saved from the school feeding program was used for school fees and/or other relevant 
projects for the pastoralists’ school children’. However, physical verifi cation of the use of 
saving accrued from the receipt of free goat meat was not undertaken.
With respect to the overall goal of the project, we conclude that the intervention did 
contribute to ‘improving the socio-economic status of pastoral communities living in arid 
areas of Kenya by creating markets for their livestock and improving the nutritional status of 
identifi ed target populations’. However, it would have been diffi cult not to achieve this wide 
spectrum, non-quantifi able goal.
With regard to the effi ciency and effectiveness of the destocking process, the intervention on 
the whole appears to have been very successful. It is evident that there is a robust network of 
strategic actors operating at both division and district levels able to identify key drivers, assess 
resulting problems, and deliberate and determine potential solutions and mobilize enough 
political will and fi nancial resources needed to act, if, as in this case, fi nancial support was 
not as much as required and not as timely as desired. From an operational perspective, 
the guidelines and data sheets developed and deployed by the implementing agency are 
generally sound, but could still be improved. Aside from the dire need to capture the timing 
of goat purchases, sales, slaughter etc, problems encountered by the evaluation team have 
arisen due to individuals failing to properly fi ll in, or even fi ll in at all, the forms they were 
using, or misplacing forms altogether. It is likely that many of the operational anomalies/
discontinuities identifi ed in this report have arisen due to the limited role of ultimate 
benefi ciaries in the intervention’s design. 
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6 Recommendations
6.1 General recommendations
Greater community-level involvement in the design of pastoralist 
interventions
In drought prone pastoralist systems, the success of both emergency and development-
focused interventions depends on whether or not the intervention is part of an integrated 
multi-agency system-based approach. Whilst evidence reviewed as part of this destocking 
evaluation supports the existence of an impressive network of strategic actors devoted to 
timely and appropriate interventions into pastoralists systems, grass-roots involvement in the 
process of identifying local problems and the deliberation of potential solutions and causes of 
action is limited. In future, it is imperative that local communities are fully involved in both 
the design and implementation of interventions which directly involve them. There should 
be greater involvement of local communities, representative of the broad spectrum of local 
society, in the design and implementation of future destocking interventions. In the future, 
pastoralists, livestock traders, school heads and health centre managers should contribute 
to the design of interventions of which they are a key component as inclusivity encourages 
ownership of a process and increases appropriateness of the outputs and outcomes. 
Future destocking interventions should also aim to enhance human capital (technical and 
management skills of individuals, groups and associations). It is generally understood that 
balanced gender/community participation in planning and implementing mitigation improves 
effectiveness and effi ciency and responds to household priorities (Swift et al. 2002).
Creation of new community-based institutions
Contingent on local political support and the availability of adequate fi nancial resources, 
it is recommended that LOCCs could be transformed into permanent, or semi-permanent 
local crisis committees. Comprising trustworthy and respected individuals, elected to 
represent diversity at the community level, these crisis committees could take a central role 
in determining the type, and timing of future interventions as well as the identifi cation of the 
most vulnerable pastoralists and the most effi cient and effective mechanisms to monitor their 
livelihood and food security status, work with multiple agencies at a local level, and provide 
a crucial social support network. It is envisaged that these networks would primarily act as 
conduits for the bi-directional fl ow of information, including comprehensive sensitization of 
the most vulnerable and marginalized households to forthcoming interventions. It is likely 
that the integration of the most vulnerable pastoralists into crisis committee support networks 
would increase the relevance, timeliness, targeting and equity of future interventions as well 
as reducing the tendency to purchase goats on a fi rst-come, fi rst-served basis.
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Bolstering existing drought mitigation strategies
It is equally imperative that future interventions in Turkana should assist in the development 
of new broad-based community-wide drought mitigation/coping strategies and the bolstering 
of existing drought coping mechanisms, and, where appropriate, endeavour to enhance 
them. Pastoralists in Turkana possess a broad menu of drought mitigation options, including: 
migration to areas with adequate pasture and water resources; • 
preservation of grazing areas; • 
division of large herds into smaller units and species; • 
keeping of multiple species; • 
stock loaning between relatives and friends; • 
collection of wild fruits and bartered cereals and; • 
begging for food. • 
Emergency and development-focused institutions should continue to support pastoralists in 
their quest to access key pasture and water resources, particularly when raids and insecurity 
concerns are a feature of almost every drought. According to ILRI (2006), pastoralists 
from Turkana also place a signifi cant emphasis on both the market (instigating markets 
where none exist and ensuring the proper functioning of markets where they do exist) and 
strategic water-based interventions (i.e., the conservation of water resources through the 
strategic construction of boreholes and dams and the strategic provision of community 
water storage). Ultimately, when existing livelihood coping strategies fail in the face of 
drought, the continued provision of food relief and livestock-based assistance (health care, 
destocking, and restocking interventions) will remain essential elements of emergency 
interventions. In addition, these interventions would be more effective if their concepts could 
be institutionalized in the communities. For instance, structures and revolving funds could be 
established to facilitate the purchase of animals, access key markets, and assist in restocking.
Promotion of the market economy
It is clear that, from the work undertaken to compile this report, future interventions in the 
district should continue to promote the strategic development and institutionalization of the 
market economy, particularly livestock marketing. Properly functioning livestock markets 
and the emergence of a more market-oriented culture among pastoralist communities could 
serve to secure the livelihoods of many currently vulnerable pastoralists. In many respects, 
destocking as a potential intervention should only be considered when system failure occurs 
in pastoralist production systems.
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Bolstering of local livestock marketing and market institutions
It is hoped that, in the long term, pastoralists in Turkana will increasingly become ‘switched 
on’ to the market or cash economy. By selling their goats to local markets, as both a 
livelihood and drought coping strategy, they would convert, permanently or temporarily, 
their livestock assets into fi nancial assets. If pastoralists eventually become accustomed to 
this strategy, it should become increasing diffi cult to fi nd producers wanting to sell their 
goats below market prices. It is therefore recommended that concerted support for the 
institutionalization of livestock marketing continues in Turkana. This includes support for 
the establishment of new markets, new LMAs, and promotion of the benefi ts of livestock 
marketing with pastoralists through awareness campaigns and through inclusion in the 
curriculum of pastoralist Farmer Field Schools in the district. It is therefore recommended 
that future destocking interventions should continue to strive to support the development 
of livestock markets at the same time as providing crucial emergency relief to the most 
vulnerable pastoralists in the worst drought affected areas. 
Enhancing and broadening general livelihood strategies
Attention should also be turned to enhancing and broadening the general livelihood 
strategies of pastoralists, particularly those with few livestock assets, whose livestock-based 
livelihoods are often on the edge of total collapse, especially during severe droughts. 
Incorporation of a research component
Whether or not interventions into pastoralists’ systems are emergency or development-based, 
it is imperative that future interventions are guided by high quality systems-based research. 
One of the key recommendations of the ILRI Report (2006) was further investigation into the 
possibilities for livelihoods diversifi cation in Turkana District.
6.2 Proposed intervention strategy
In proposing an intervention strategy, we assume that the ultimate objective is to save assets. 
As livestock assets are not yielding interest but instead are using scares resources, it would 
make sense to encourage pastoralists to (at least temporarily) convert some of their livestock 
into fi nancial assets, which could eventually be used for restocking.
Timing of destocking intervention
It is recognized that NGOs, in seeking to propose emergency interventions, work under 
the constraint that emergency funds are usually not released by donors until an emergency 
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is well under way. However, it would be recommendable to advocate early release of 
emergency (or other) funds when a drought is eminent (and predicted by early warning 
systems). In the case of livestock interventions, we would defi ne ‘early’ as: Before the animals 
become weak and their price is affected, or at least before the animals becoming too weak to 
sell them on the regular market (as a grade 3 goat), predisposing the community to a major 
potential loss of livestock assets.
In proposing possible interventions (below) we will refer to the case where a donor is found 
in this early stage as the fi rst scenario. The second scenario—alas the most common and 
realistic one—is when a timely intervention is not possible because funds are released late. 
Programmers thinking about the fi rst scenario need to have a contingency plan for the second 
scenario, while donors need to be fl exible and allow for budget reallocations/realignment 
to fi t the second scenario. This principle could be previously agreed upon in the project 
proposal. The proposed interventions under the second scenario could also be regarded 
as complementary to the interventions under the fi rst scenario, if those are not regarded 
effi cacious by themselves.
Early interventions—First scenario
In case a donor could be motivated to release funds in such an ‘early’ stage, some early 
mitigation activities could be proposed. Two complementary approaches could be worked 
out for situations with and without local livestock markets.
Where there are markets already in place, off-take could be temporarily increased/stimulated 
by tackling some constraints to rapid market expansion:
Demand side:
By providing enough working capital for traders (i.e. credits or revolving funds);• 
Promote the transportation of larger numbers of goats to terminal markets, by • 
providing transport or subsidies (we realize VSF-B has bad experiences with this, but 
would encourage you to refi ne the methods used based on the lessons learned) 
Supply side:
Run an awareness campaign• 1 among pastoralists to motivate them to sell
Where there are no markets:
1. As pastoralists are usually only selling their animals when they are really destitute, there is need to create 
awareness of the optional coping strategy of timely selling their animals to the markets, i.e. temporarily convert-
ing livestock assets into fi nancial assets.
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Demand side:
Establish/promote short-term markets;• 2
Possibly provide means of transport for traders (from elsewhere) to venture into the • 
interior, by providing or subsidizing transport;
Maybe other incentives are needed as a catalyst that motivates traders to venture into • 
the interior, where there are no markets.
Supply side:
More than elsewhere, this will need to be accompanied by a thorough awareness-• 
raising campaign (see footnote 1 overleaf).
Late intervention—Second scenario
Such intervention should be regarded as a safety net, and should try by all means not to 
create ‘benefi ciary dependency’ (in recurring drought) or interfere with the markets:
Initiate a destocking intervention, buying weak or thin animals at a price below the • 
lowest ‘market price’ (e.g. for grade 3 goats: the data in this report would suggest 300 
KES for Turkana District).
Consider supplementing this (low) intervention price with non-fi nancial support: e.g. • 
providing a bag of supplementary livestock feed concentrates with each transaction 
(or for a number of goats sold); or instead of offering a price at all: exchanging a 
number of goats for one bag of feed concentrates.
Use the meat (process and consumption) as locally as possible in a way that does not • 
substitute local demand for goat meat; for instance, have it consumed by the local 
vulnerable community, which does not usually buy goat (meat) from the market.
Instead of using local market traders, consider establishing/promoting short-term • 
markets with consumption on the spot (Oxfam model);
If schools are chosen as the benefi ciaries, then try to target day-schools with priority, • 
as they don’t have meat in their usual menu.
Targeting and households’ share of intervention
Targeting between areas could be done based on assessments of descriptive factors of 
drought affectedness (as done under TELO 2005) complemented with market access 
specifi cs. As the proposed approach under the fi rst scenario is more a ‘laissez faire’ strategy, 
the traders should be left doing what they do best, but may be morally encouraged to buy 
from different adakars and goat owners.
2. Probably the best way to establish a temporary market is to have the community identify the lack of a mar-
ket as a constraint and then propose its establishment. Without community by-in, there will be no supply (no 
timely sales) and traders will lose interest after their fi rst disappointing experiences.
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In the second scenario, more thought needs to be given to targeting. Based on the objective 
of saving assets, one could argue that the individual households’ share of the intervention 
(i.e. the number of weak goats they are allowed to sell) should be proportionate to the size 
of their herds. But this would not take into account the compassionate feeling that those that 
have few animals have more to lose. However, as these would qualify as the most vulnerable 
households, they would qualify with priority for destocking. Assuming they all had small herd 
sizes, the number of goats destocked per household should be very small. 
If the intervention complemented the goat purchase with in-kind donation of livestock feed, 
then the impact of the intervention would not be determined by the number of goats, but 
rather the number of transactions (i.e. households reached). In such a case, one could suffi ce 
with destocking one goat per vulnerable household. The scale of the intervention would be 
mostly determined by the budget, and logistics, for feed concentrates.
If the intervention only entails buying goats, and our advice is followed to pay a lower than 
market price (i.e. KES 300), then the down-side of the coin would be that more goats need to 
be purchased per household in order for them to acquire enough funds to use in restocking 
(assuming they do not use the money to buy food).
In any case, for logistic purposes and to avoid people corrupting the records, it is probably 
advisable to stipulate an equal number of goats to be destocked from each household, and 
enforce this rule.
6.3 Recommendations for destocking interventions
Benefi ciaries of free goat meat
It is recommended that, in conjunction with executive implementing agencies, local crisis 
committees should play a proactive role in the identifi cation of free goat meat benefi ciaries. 
Whilst it is recommended that schools and health centres should remain key benefi ciaries of 
future destocking interventions, it is also recommended that local crisis committees and the 
executive implementing agencies should also consider providing free goat meat, and/or other 
key necessities, to the most vulnerable households identifi ed by the local crisis committees. 
On the spot slaughtering of goats at the adakar level and the distribution of free goat carcases 
to the most vulnerable households in the area circumvents the constraints of caring for goats 
and transporting/trekking them to recipient institutions. 
If schools were to be targeted, it is suggested that a higher nutritional impact could be 
achieved by targeting the day schools fi rst, as they usually do not have meat in their diets. 
Only after all day schools have been reached should boarding schools be considered. In 
conjunction with school heads and health centre managers, the crisis committees should 
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also play an active, transparent, and participatory role in devising the logistics of free goat 
meat deliveries in a transparent, verifi able and participatory manner. For example, it is 
essential that, in future destocking interventions, systems should be developed, and strictly 
applied, to: better match free goat supply to consumption demand; ensure that free goat meat 
supplements and not only substitutes usual animal protein intake (particularly if the supply of 
goat meat mirrors the institute’s usual goat meat consumption) and; adequately account for 
the need for a holding area for goats (including costs associated with feeding and caring for 
the goats). It is also suggested that goat skins could be sold by recipient institutions. 
In addition, it is important that verifi cation protocols in future destocking interventions are 
both comprehensive and are rigorously adhered to. It is important that recipient institutions 
should provide detailed and verifi able accounts of what savings from suspended goat meat 
purchases, and goat skins were used for. It is also imperative that clear and accurate records 
are kept for the number, condition, timing, slaughter of goats received, as well as verifi able 
details of their consumption. A system should also be devised for verifying school children’s 
additional consumption of goat meat.
With regard to including the most vulnerable pastoralist households as benefi ciaries in future 
destocking interventions, it is recommended that executive implementing agencies consider 
adopting a two-tier system. In this system, relatively less vulnerable households, with larger 
livestock holdings, would be encouraged to actively destock and receive salvage payments 
for their goats. Conversely, the most vulnerable households would become net recipients of 
free goat meat or key necessities. However, it is important to couch this kind of intervention 
in efforts to promote, where possible, livelihood diversifi cation for the most vulnerable 
households. In some cases, where better livelihood options are present, destocking could be 
used as part of a strategy for pastoralists to transit from pastoralism to other, more rewarding, 
livelihood activities. 
Goat intervention price
In view of VSF-Belgium efforts to develop livestock markets and promote the market-
orientation of pastoralists in Turkana, the pricing of goats during a destocking intervention 
deserves considered thought. We have explained in the discussion why it is not advisable to 
pay a higher than market price (i.e. salvage value) for weak goats, as this would undermine 
the institutionalization of ‘timely sales of livestock to the market’ as a drought coping strategy 
for pastoralists.
Instead, we would suggest paying a reasonable salvage value (e.g. KES 300) or anything 
below the lowest market price for grade 3 goats—the lowest quality traded at conventional 
livestock markets. This would still serve as a safety net for those that did not sell in time, 
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while not rewarding them for not having sold to local markets. Conversely, once pastoralists 
become accustomed to selling their goats, they will be rewarded for doing so in a timely 
manner at the local markets.
Scale and duration of destocking intervention
If goats were to be destocked at a lower price (KES 300) this would drastically affect the scale 
of the project. More goats would be destocked and more meat would become available as 
relief food. This drastically improves the utilization of these livestock assets, as alternatively 
these weak goats might have died.
However, if complementing each transaction with an in-kind donation of livestock feeds, the 
scale of the intervention would be mostly determined by the budget for feed concentrates. It 
is debatable whether in this case one or more goats per household should be destocked. It 
depends on many factors. If the destocking intervention comes before any rains have fallen, 
and it is likely that many animals will still die, then this decision does not have a big impact 
on water and pasture resources. One could argue that the vulnerable pastoralist should get 
the chance to save as many goats from their herd as possible. But the number of livestock 
remaining in the herd will however affect the utilization of the supplementary livestock 
feeds. If, however, the intervention comes after some rains have fallen, it is possible that 
more animals will survive, and hence destocking more than one goats seems unreasonable. 
The pressure on water and pasture would have been seriously reduced by the mortality of 
livestock.
Another scale consideration is on the demand side. The more goats are being destocked 
the more vulnerable households would need to be identifi ed. This, however, should not 
be the largest constraint as from TELO 2005 there is experience in working with schools 
and health institutions, these could always serve as a back-up plan. However, using those 
institutions will need some more thought in terms of the timing of deliveries and keeping of 
large numbers of goats. Also schools expressed the wish to receive goats over a longer period 
of time. But postponing the purchase of goats would affect their quality and disadvantage 
their owners, while temporarily keeping goats involves extra costs and does not reduce 
the pressure on water and pastures. Slaughtering goats on the spot—at adakar level—and 
redistributing them to the vulnerable households circumvents the whole transport constraints 
of providing goats to institutions.
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Suggested improvements to monitoring forms
These recommendations are based on the monitoring forms used in TELO 2005 and assuming 
that the very same intervention was to be conducted, i.e. buying goats from adakar producers 
by traders, and delivering them to institutes where they would eventually be slaughtered.
We would recommend that the ‘Turkana Emergency Livestock Off-take Monitoring forms’ be 
split into two different tools:
To monitor the deliveries of goats to the institutes; once the LMA-representative and • 
LOCC offi cials and institute’s representative have signed, the trader could proceed to 
receive his/her refund;
To document the slaughtering of goats; this could be recorded far after the delivery • 
date (not under time pressure to close the books, as trader would receive his money 
based on delivery); this would enhance the accountability on the utilization of the 
goats by the institutes.
The slaughtering form could be complemented with a section in which the institute has to 
account for the use of the income from the goat skins, and/or other save funds on meals. 
The ‘goat purchasing forms’ could be improved by:
adding the dates of purchase for each transaction and the overall date of delivery to • 
the schools;
adding the location of the adakar (at the time of intervention).• 
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Appendices
Appendix 1 Review of destocking and TKDP marketing 
activities—March 2006 issues to address with VSF-B offi ces: 
Destocking
1. For our literature study:
Which organizations (Gov or NGOs) have done destocking?• 
In this district?• 
Elsewhere in the region?• 
Do you know of any reports about this?• 
2a. We would like to see the fi eld data on animals destocked/culled: number; timing; 
condition and species depending on volume and quality of the data:
Can we borrow the original data or get a copy?• 
2b. What prices did the benefi ciaries receive? How was this price set? By whom?
Are these answers in the destocking report?• 
We needed average prices (here for goats) in the specifi c locations where destocking • 
took place.
Review/study the dataset from monitoring of traders (is the complete data here at VSF-B? (we 
will also study the ALRMP data by these specifi c locations)
Later (for marketing opportunities) we will also need average prices of other livestock • 
for the whole district and/or per division.
Is the ALRMP data the only source for data on these average prices?• 
2c. (Average payment is captured in 2b.) But additionally:
What is the number of pastoralists that benefi ted from the destocking? Preferably by • 
location/local market level? 
3. and 4. To compute the scale of the intervention (We got the numbers of animals destocked 
in 2a. and now) we need the district herd estimates:
Which different bodies collect this kind of data?• 
What different estimates exist?• 
Which one does VSF-B trust most/use?• 
Or: hint us in the direction where we can fi nd such data (preferably by division)
Concentration/spread of intervention:• 
If not already captured under 2a. or 2c.:• 
location of destocking;• 
numbers of animals destocked by locations• 
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numbers of benefi ciaries (including receipiants of meat etc.) by location • 
Environment: water and pasture pressures in areas where destocking occurred:• 
Can you tell us something about this?• 
Was it the criteria for choosing the destocking locations?• 
Any reports from water and pasture technical projects on this?• 
Impact? on markets (prices and LMAs)• 
Were volumes of sales affected?• 
Were prices affected?• 
Was market attendance affected?• 
Any of these refl ected in the market monitoring data for that particular 4 weeks?• 
(ALRMP data probably not focused enough)• 
5. Evaluate the actual process
Problem identifi cation (Quantifying and Qualifying)• 
Who identifi ed the problem? (Who were the drivers?)• 
Why did they think it was a problem?• 
What evidence was used to substantiate the need for such a project?• 
Timing: Why now? (why last year and not now?)• 
Who initiated the destocking project? (C/N  Proposal or Donor led?)• 
Decision making (actors and their considerations)
Who were the actors that had a say in this?• 
What different role did they play?• 
How did they infl uence how the project was designed?• 
Alternative intervention mechanisms • 
Where any alternatives to this project considered?• 
Can you think of any now?• 
Why was this particular approach chosen over others?• 
VSF-B (and donors) consideration on:
Type (why goats? not cattle?)• 
Scale of intervention (Why 6000? budget constraint? Proposal for how much?);• 
geographic location (targeting)• 
on timing• 
choice of partners (imposed or voluntary; reliable?)• 
Effectiveness in achieving set objectives• 
Was there a Logframe for the project?• 
Let’s us run through it and check:• 
To what extent the outputs and deliverables were met?• 
Evaluate the actual logistics arrangements used• 
Respective criteria for how traders, benefi ciaries (or markets), institutions, ‘inspectors’/• 
signatories were selected;
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What criteria were used to select:
Traders?• 
Benefi ciaries (or markets)?• 
Institutions receiving the goats/meat/etc.?• 
Inspectors/signatories of forms used?• 
Budget/fi nancial implications for VSF-B and sustainability of this structure when up-• 
scaling?
How the budget was managed:
Can you share with us a breakdown of budget allocations?• 
Were you satisfi ed with how the budget was spent?• 
Would you do anything different the next time? (lessons learned)• 
What if this project was to be carried out at a (much) larger scale: What budget lines/• 
expenditures would require a larger/smaller portion of the overall available funds?
Reviewing forms that were used:
Please share with us the forms that were used in the administration of this destocking • 
activity
Having used these in practice:
Is there anything you would suggest changing for future use?• 
Effi ciency of destocking in terms of:
Effective use of fi nancial resources already captured above• 
Effective use of human resources• 
In your view, were human resource used effi ciently?• 
If you had to do it again (at same scale) would you do anything different?• 
If you had to do it at a larger scale: would you do anything different?• 
Effective use of networks (including information fl ows)• 
In your view, were networks used effi ciently?• 
If you had to do it again (at same scale) would you do anything different?• 
If you had to do it at a larger scale: would you do anything different?• 
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Appendix 2 Issues to address with key informants of 
other organizations: (District Livestock Production Offi cer; 
SNV; ALRMP; World Vision; ITDC) Destocking
1. For our Literature study:
Which organizations (Gov or NGO’s) have done destocking?• 
In this district?• 
Elsewhere in the region?• 
Do you know of any reports about this?• 
2. 3. and 4. Ask other local organization about their view on appropriateness of the project 
and the choice of destocking areas In general:
Do you feel such destocking projects are appropriate?• 
Would you suggest something different/alternative approach?• 
Would there be potential synergies/areas of cooperation with your organization?• 
Concentration/spread of intervention:
(Targeting)• 
What do you think of VSF-B’s choice of area’s/locations for destocking?• 
(Scale)• 
What about the numbers of animals destocked by locations?• 
And the numbers of benefi ciaries reached?• 
(both goat sellers; traders and recipients of meat etc.) • 
Environment: water and pasture pressures in areas where destocking occurred:• 
What is your impression of the land pressure in the areas chosen?• 
Would you have evidence (reports) to substantiate that?• 
Would you have targeted other locations?• 
5. What impression did you have about the effi ciency of the destocking project in terms of:
Use of fi nancial resources?• 
In your view, were fi nancial resources used appropriately?• 
If you had to do it again would you do anything different?• 
If you had to do it at a larger scale, would you do anything different?• 
Use of human resources:
In your view, were human resources used effi ciently?• 
If you had to do it again would you do anything different?• 
If you had to do it at a larger scale, would you do anything different?• 
Use of networks/information fl ows:
In your view, were networks used effi ciently?• 
Was there wide consultation?• 
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Were you consulted? (if appropriate)• 
Did you hear of any complaints in the civil society?• 
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Appendix 3 Key informant interview crib sheet for head 
teachers and health centre managers
1. How many goats did you receive? 
2. Over how many weeks?
3. What was the condition of the goats?
4. When were they slaughtered?
5. Were there any costs incurred keeping or processing the goats?
6. How many children/patients were fed? Do you have records of that?
7. What was the additional feeding/nutritional value?
8. Do the pupils or in-patients usually eat meat?
9. What is the usual animal protein content of menu in grams/individual?
10. Did the local butcher lose business?
11. Institutions’ budget for meals:
12. Did the institution make net savings on its meal budget?
13. What was done with income from the goat hides?
14. Did the intervention affect school enrolment fi gures?
15. How could this intervention have been improved?
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Appendix 4 Adakar Focus Group Discussion crib sheet
1. Location of adakar(s) represented
2. Name of adakar(s) represented
3. Number of individuals present
4. Number of households per adakar
5. Distance from local market
6. Did the adakar benefi t from VSF-Belgium’s destocking activity that took place in January 
and February 2005?
7. How many goats were bought as part of the destocking intervention?
8. How many households sold goats as part of the intervention?
9. What was the income received from the sale of goats used for?
10. How were you sensitized to the destocking?
11. Was destocking a good idea?
12. If required, how could the destocking intervention have been improved?—Group was 
prompted on scale and timing.
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Appendix 5 LMA and Livestock Traders Focus Group 
Discussion crib sheet
1. Was the group involved in the VSF-B destocking activity in 2005?
2. How many goats were bought by your members/came through the market and at what 
price?
3. What effect did the activity have on: market prices (before and after?); market volumes, 
and; market attendance?
4. Was destocking good for traders and LMA? If so, why?
5. How busy were you during destocking?
6. Were there too many goats to cope with?
7. Could you continue with your normal trading as well?
8. What percentage of trade was taken by destocking activity?
9. Were there any problems?
10. Would you do it again?
11. How would you feel if the destocking was conducted on a larger scale?
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Appendix 7 Comparing goat delivery with goat 
slaughtering records
Zone Institution (school or clinic)
Total 
goats
received*
Slaughtered 
goats (record)
% of goats 
with slaugh-
ter records
Central Turkana Ille Primary 93 70 75
 Kalemunyang Primary 131 23 18
 Kanamkener Mixed Primary 61 16 26
 Kangatotha Primary 93 63 68
 Kawalase Primary 15 4 27
 Kerio (Boarding) Primary 98 175 179
 Lodwar Girls Primary 93 31 33
 Lodwar Mixed Primary 93 46 49
 Lorengippi Primary 95 61 64
 Lorugumu Primary 88 42 48
 Nadapal Primary 93 47 51
 Nakurio Primary 88 35 40
 Namoruputh Primary 95 390 411
 Napuu Primary 93 46 49
 Naremit Primary 95 195 205
 Trans Africa High 93 37 40
 Turkana Girls Primary 81 156 193
 Turkana Girls Secondary 122 92 75
Central Turkana Total  1529  
Lake Zone Turkana Kachoda Primary 35 37 106
 Kaeris Primary 59 23 39
 Kalimapus Primary 53 66 125
 Kaling Primary 75 22 29
 Kalokol Girls Primary 97 107 110
 Kalokol Mixed Primary 109 63 58
 Kataboi Primary 93 30 32
 Loarengak Boys Primary 90 64 71
 Loarengak Girls Primary 96 23 24
 Loitanit Primary 89 32 36
 Lokitaung Mixed Primary 53 20 38
 Lokitaung Primary 20 10 50
 Lokitaung Secondary 65 34 52
 Lokitaung SubDistrict Hospital 23 12 52
 Nachukui Primary 93 108 116
 Natukobenyo Girls Primary 78 35 45
79
 Kanakurdio Primary 60 17 28
Lake Zone Turkana Total  703  
Northwest Turkana AIC Lokichogio Girls Pry 45 10 22
 AIC Lokichogio Mixed Pry 70 26 37
 AIC Lopiding Primary 35 10 29
 AIC Lopur Primary 60 56 93
 AIC Nanam Primary 18 18 100
 Kakuma Arid Zone Boarding Pry 84 21 25
 Kakuma Girls Primary 61 21 34
 Kakuma Mixed Primary 93 22 24
 Kakuma Secondary 84 49 58
 Kalobeyei Primary 30 10 33
 Letea Primary 24 18 75
 Lokangae Girls Primary 24 24 100
 Lokichokio AIC Health Centre 24 24 100
 Makutano Primary 54 23 43
 Nakalale Primary 16 16 100
 Napeililim Mixed Boarding Pry 72 72 100
 Nasiger Primary School 36 19 53
 Oropoi Primary School 12 10 83
 St Comas Napopongoit Primary 17 17 100
 St John Primary 63 63 100
Northwest Turkana Total  529  
South Turkana Arumrum Primary 6 4 67
 Elelea Primary 72 30 42
 Kaaruko Primary 24 24 100
 Kainuk Girls Primary 72 4 6
 Kalapata Primary 40 60 150
 Kalemungorok Primary 60 17 28
 Kapelibok Primary 36 12 33
 Kapese Primary 95 105 111
 Katilia Primary 95 59 62
 Katilu Boys 39 39 100
 Katilu Health Center 18 4 22
 Katilu Mixed Boarding Pry 93 60 65
 Katilu Secondary 56 30 54
 Kekorisogol Primary 24 6 25
 Kopotiro Mixed Primary 18 9 50
 Koputiro Mixed Primary 18  0
 Korinyang Primary 93 59 63
80
 Lochwangikamatak Primary 65 160 246
 Lokapel Primary 60 50 83
 Lokapel/Kanaodon Primary 12 10 83
 Lokichar Girls Primary 84 58 69
 Lokichar Mixed Primary 106 72 68
 Lokori Girls Primary 60 20 33
 Lokwii Primary 84 57 68
 Lotubae Primary 60 25 42
 Morulem Primary 93 42 45
 Nabeiye Primary 24 10 42
 Nakaalei Primary 36 18 50
 Nakwamoru Primary 72 18 25
 Nalemsekon Primary 36 24 67
South Turkana Total   1086  
Totals  5381 3847 53
‘Over-slaugthered’ 712
Total goats delivered overall to all schools 6338 3135 49
* Only for those schools with slaughter records in TELO fi eld data
No slaughter records were kept for the following institutes
Number of goats delivered*
Central Turkana:
Lodwar District Hospital 17
Northwest Turkana:
Kakuma Mission Hospital 25
Our Lady’s Girls Secondary 84
St Clare of Assis’s Homecraft Centre 27
St Luke Nakururum Primary 8
St Mark Songot 8
St Mathew Nadome 8
South Turkana:
Juluk Primary 72
Kainuk Mixed Primary 95
Kang’akipur Primary 24
Kangirisae Primary 24
Kangitit Girls High 93
Kaputir Mixed Boarding Pry 91
Lokori Mixed Primary 93
Loyapat Mixed Boarding Pry 93
Napusimoru Primary 36
RCEA Lokori Secondary 66
Turkana Intergrated Primary 93
81
Appendix 8 Number and location of adakars benefi ting 
from destocking
  Count of benefi ting adakars per area
Zone Area Total
Central Turkana Central Turkana 3
Eliyespring 40
Kainuk 18
Kalemunyang 74
Kanamkener 20
Kangatotha 52
Kerio 7
Kerio/Nakurio 113
Korio 9
Lochwaa 3
Lodwar 173
Lorengippi 40
Lorugum 175
Nadapal 77
Namoruputh 72
Napusimoru 20
Naremit 76
Nawoitorong 59
Central Turkana Total 1031
Lake Zone Turkana Kaaleng 14
Kachoda 2
Kachoda 4
Kaeris 12
Kaikor 15
Kaleng 5
Kalimapus 15
Kalokol 13
Kalokol 23
Kanakurdio 7
Kanukurdio  
Kataboi 69
Loarengak 9
Lokitaung 47
Nachukui 47
Lake Zone Turkana Total 282
82
Zone Area Total
Northwest Turkana Kakuma 84
Kakuma 13
Kalobeyei 7
Kalobeyei/Oropoi 2
Letea 1
Letea 3
Lokangae 20
Lokichogio 53
Lokore 41
Lolupe 17
Lopur 8
Makutano 16
Nanam 5
Napeililim 16
Napeililim 9
Nasiger 8
Nasiger 10
Northwest Turkana Total 313
South Turkana Arumrum 2
 Elelea 10
 Elelea 9
 Juluk 22
 Kainuk 72
 Kainuk/Loyapat 16
 Kalemungorok 19
 Kalemungorok 17
 Kanaodon 4
 Kangakipur 10
 Kangakipur 2
 Kangirisae/Nakaalei 14
 Kapelibok 23
 Kaputir 31
 Katilia 33
 Katilu 69
 Kekorisogol 4
 Lochwaa 29
 Lokichar 190
 Lokori 14
83
Zone Area Total
 Lokori 17
 Lokori/Kangitit 44
 Lokwi 18
 Loperot 26
 Lotubae 37
 Morulem 23
 Morulem 22
 Nabeiye 14
 Nakaalei 23
 Nakwamoru 33
 Nalemusekon 1
South Turkana Total 848
Grand Total 2474
